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ABSTRACT 
 
The rate of cesarean sections (CS) has grown substantially over the last two decades, now 
accounting for roughly one third of all births. The economics literature has established that a 
significant part of this growth is the result of physician incentives rather than medical necessity. 
Increasingly, however, the medical literature is raising questions about possible correlations 
between increased CS use and negative health outcomes for children in later life. For example, 
CS changes the intestinal bacteria of the infant and possibly compromises their immune system. 
My paper, “Cesarean Sections and Later Child Health Outcomes,” provides the first causal 
evidence that CS has an effect on later child health outcomes. Using variation in medical 
malpractice premiums as an instrument for risk-adjusted MSA-level rates of CS, I find that CS 
significantly increases the total rate of hospitalizations and the rate of hospitalizations that 
present with asthma for children up to 18 years old. These findings suggest that CS may have 
negative externalities on the child born via CS, which has implications for the evaluation of the 
socially optimal use of the CS procedure.    
In “Financial Distress, Maternal Stress, and Infant Health,” I investigate the effect of 
financial stress caused by the mortgage crisis, a large and negative exogenous financial shock, on 
infant health. I use all births in counties with over 100,000 individuals, spanning the entire 
country, and link these with county-level mortgage delinquency rates. I find that increases in 
financial stress increase premature births. A 10 percentage point increase in the mortgage 
delinquency rate, which occurred in roughly 10% of counties considered over this time period, 
would lead to an increase in premature births of approximately 5%. This result is robust to 
multiple specifications using different measures of financial stress collected from independent 
sources. I find evidence that financial stress decreases birth weight and increases NICU (Neo-
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Natal Intensive Care Unit) admissions. Decreases in prenatal care utilization and increases in 
cigarette consumption in the third trimester are important mechanisms underlying the negative 
relationship between financial stress and infant health. 
      My third paper is “The Effect of Tort Reform on Patient Safety,” co-authored with 
Sarah Miller. Tort reform reduces the liability for medical errors and may create moral hazard for 
physicians and hospitals. In this paper, we measure the effect of tort reform on a large class of 
medical errors: adverse patient safety events that occur in hospitals. We find that the adoption of 
a cap on non-economic damages is associated with an increase in adverse patient safety events of 
about 5 percent. Most of the observed increase is a result of higher levels of hospital-acquired 
infections and adverse events occurring during post-operative care. We do not find any evidence 
that tort reform affects the characteristics of patients admitted to the hospital, suggesting that 
selection of more risky patients is not driving our results. 
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CHAPTER 1 
CESAREAN SECTIONS AND LATER CHILD HEALTH OUTCOMES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Between 1996 and 2009, the rate of cesarean sections in the US rose from 20.7% to 
32.8% (Ventura et al. 1996 and Martin et al. 2012). Since 2009, the rate has stabilized at 
approximately a third of all births, a number well in excess of the 2010 target rate of 15% 
suggested by the Centers for Disease Control (US Department of Health and Human Services 
2010). Within the US, there is significant regional variation in the rates of cesarean sections 
(CS), ranging from 22.6% in Utah to 39.7% in Louisiana (Martin et al. 2012).  Differences in CS 
rates can only be partially explained by differences in patient characteristics and are largely 
driven by nonmedical factors, with higher rates of CS reflecting less medically appropriate use of 
the procedure (Baicker et al. 2006).  Many other nations have also experienced growth in CS 
rates.
1
 
The potentially excessive use of CS is of concern because it has been linked to adverse 
health outcomes. There is a large literature on the short-term health consequences for infants, 
such as impaired lung function, altered metabolism, and altered feeding. More recently, an 
emerging medical literature has focused on long term negative health effects (Hyde and Modi 
2012), including potential links between being born via CS and increased risk of asthma.  These 
infants are not exposed to the maternal bacteria of the birth canal and have altered intestinal 
bacteria compared to infants born naturally, which could have a lasting impact on the immune 
system and other important processes, such as metabolic function (Hyde and Modi 2012).  
However, it is difficult to establish a causal link, both because some cesarean sections are 
                                                          
1
 China, in particular, has seen a very large increase in the rate of CS recently, increasing from 25.9% in 2003 to 
46.2% in 2007 (Lumbiganon et al. 2010 and Gibbons et al. 2010). South American countries also have very high 
rates, led by Brazil, which in 2006 had a CS rate of 45.9% (Gibbons et al 2010).   
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medically necessary and because many studies suffer from an omitted variable problem.  Indeed, 
the lack of causal evidence has even led some scholars to go so far as to call for a randomized 
controlled trial (Hyde et al. 2012). 
In this paper, I provide the first evidence of a causal link between being born by CS and 
later health outcomes, specifically asthma.  To do so, I create MSA-level rates of co-morbidities 
using the Nationwide Inpatient Sample Kids and MSA-level rates of CS from the National Vital 
Statistics System.  I identify causal effects by using medical malpractice rates as an instrumental 
variable for MSA-level CS rates. Increases in medical malpractice premiums have been shown to 
increase the rates of CS (Dubay et al. 1999 and Baicker et al. 2006), which doctors may be 
performing defensively, as a significant proportion of malpractice suits faced by obstetricians are 
related to delaying or not performing a cesarean section (Minkoff 2012). Malpractice premiums 
are primarily driven by state level factors, such as the number of firms offering insurance and 
state tort laws, and are largely unrelated to patient safety (Thorpe 2005). I also show that 
malpractice premiums have little effect on infant health. I find a very large, robust, and causal 
effect on the rate of total hospitalizations and on the rate of hospitalizations that present with 
asthma and other chronic pulmonary disease, particularly among younger kids.  
Establishing a causal effect of CS rates on the incidence of asthma is especially important 
given that the rates of asthma have gone up dramatically in recent years.  According to the CDC 
(2013), the incidence of asthma increased by 28% between 2001 and 2011 and is particularly 
high among children.  In 2011, 14% of US children had been diagnosed with asthma at some 
point in their lives (CDC 2013). The welfare cost to society in terms of losses to productivity for 
adults, losses to schooling for children, increased medical spending, and increased mortality is 
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potentially very high. The total cost of asthma was estimated to be $56 billion for the year 2007 
alone (Barnett and Nurmagambetov 2011).  
This finding could also have an important impact on doctor and patient decision making.  
Many CS are elective and may be chosen due to the widespread notion that the procedure is a 
safer for the mother and infant, despite the absence of conclusive evidence (Visco et al. 2006). 
Some patients and doctors may also prefer CS in order to control the timing of birth.  For their 
part, medical providers may be increasing the rate of CS in response to the reimbursement 
differential that typically exists between CS and vaginal delivery (Gruber et al. 2009). Part of the 
increasing trend in CS may also be explained by medical providers financially compensating for 
falling fertility rates (Gruber and Owings 1996). More information on the possible negative 
effects of CS will allow doctors and patients to make a more informed and decision about 
whether CS is appropriate in a specific case.  
The remainder of the paper is set at as follows: section II presents background 
information and a review of the literature concerning the potential effect of CS on asthma and 
other chronic pulmonary diseases and the potential mechanisms. Section III discusses the data 
sources and the construction of relevant variables. Section IV presents the results of a number of 
different specifications and includes a discussion on instrument validity, section V extends the 
analysis to other outcomes, and section VI concludes.  
II. BACKGROUND 
There is a large, but inconclusive, medical literature on the link between CS and asthma and 
other immune deficiencies. Håkansson and Källén (2003) use linked medical birth data and 
hospital discharge data in Sweden to find that the procedure is associated with a significant 
increase in the risk of developing asthma and gastroenteritis in children older than one.  Renz-
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Polster et al. (2005) found that CS was correlated with allergic rhinoconjunctivitis and there was  
a gender specific association with asthma, with increased risk for girls. Using the Avon 
Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children, Maitra et al. (2004) found no increase in the risk for 
asthma, allergies, or wheezing. In a meta-analysis of 23 studies, Cho and Norman (2013) find 
that children born by CS have a 20% higher risk of developing asthma. Others have found a link 
between CS and other immune system deficiencies such as celiac disease (Decker et al. 2010) 
and a female-specific link with multiple sclerosis (Maghzi et al. 2012). 
However, Lynch and Iams (2013) note that the literature is suspect because there is also a 
large literature that suggests an association between preterm birth and altered immune function. 
This may be the driving factor behind all the results because CS babies are more likely to have 
been born preterm because they are more likely to have health complications (Lynch and Iams 
2013). There are other potential sources of endogeneity as well, as less healthy women are more 
likely to have cesarean sections and are also more likely to have less healthy infants. While some 
of the above studies restrict their sample only to elective CS, these may still be biased as there is 
some evidence that mothers who choose CS are more likely to be wealthier and have private 
insurance (Coonrod et al. 2000), which would generally reduce the infant’s probability of 
developing asthma, which is linked with environment (Bloom et al. 2012 and Adler et al. 1994). 
The contribution of this paper is to address these issues of endogeneity and to establish a causal 
effect of CS on later health outcomes, such as asthma.  
There are several potential mechanisms that may underlie the effect of CS on the immune 
system. The most prominent of these is related to the “Hygiene Hypothesis,” in which early 
exposure to bacteria plays a large role in shaping the immune system and its responses later in 
life (Strachan 1989).  In particular, there is growing literature on the bacterial biome of the gut, 
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which is estimated to have around 100 times as many genes in aggregate as does the human 
genome (Neu and Rushing 2012).  Intestinal bacteria have a large role in shaping the immune 
system, as the bacteria stimulate the production of antibodies to pathogens by the lymphoid 
tissue. These gut bacteria perform a number of metabolic activities, as well as training the 
immune system, preventing the growth of harmful bacteria, and producing needed vitamins. 
However, there is a lot unknown about this diverse biome, as not all species of gut bacteria can 
be cultured, leading to projects such as the Human Microbiome Project, which hopes to map the 
bacteria of the gut and explore its effect on human health (Neu and Rushing 2012). 
CS may have an effect on the makeup of intestinal bacteria by changing the first 
interaction an infant has with bacteria.  It is unclear whether the intestinal ecosystem is generally 
sterile at the time of birth, though it appears to be for at least some infants (Neu and Rushing 
2012). However, the species diversity is low in most infants shortly after birth and increases with 
environmental exposure (Magne et al. 2006).  Dominguez-Bello et al. (2010) found that the 
method of delivery was the primary determinant of a newborn’s bacterial community.  Babies 
born naturally had a bacterial community composition that was most similar to the vaginal 
community of their mothers, whereas the intestines of infants delivered via CS were colonized 
predominantly by bacteria typically found on skin and in hospitals (Dominguez-Bello et al. 
2010).  Additionally, the intestinal bacteria of these infants appear to be less diverse and lacking 
in species generally associated with good intestinal function, such as bifidobacteria (Biasucci 
2008).  These differences may last for many years. A study of seven year olds found that those 
born through CS had significantly lower numbers of clostridia bacteria, which has been 
previously linked to asthma (Saliminen et al. 2004).  
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A possible confounder of the link between CS and gut bacteria is that CS is almost 
always performed after the administration of antibiotics, as dictated by standards of care (New 
and Rushing 2012). Few medical studies directly address this and none try to disentangle this 
effect. This paper will also be unable to do so. However, antibiotics are exclusively 
recommended for CS and for preterm premature rupture of membranes and are actively 
discouraged for all other births (American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 2011), so 
reducing the number of elective CS surgeries would also reduce the number of infants exposed to 
antibiotics in utero.  
Another potential mechanism is the effect of CS on breastfeeding.  Evans et al. (2003) 
found that babies born through CS consume significantly less breast milk in the first days of life, 
though the volume of milk consumed is equivalent to those born vaginally after 6 days.  Since 
breast milk is a stimulator for intestinal flora, differences in early dietary support due to delayed 
lactation could also have long-term effects (Neu and Rushing 2011).  
Finally, the stress of being born naturally could also be an important mechanism for 
healthy immune development.  Contractions associated with natural birth, and indeed the whole 
process of natural birth, is intensely stressful for infants, who have higher levels of adrenaline 
after birth than adults do immediately after a heart attack (Hyde et al. 2012). This stress response 
may have an epigenetic impact and may modify the differentiation of a number of cell types, 
particularly immune cells, which have receptors for stress hormones. Hyde et al. (2012) 
hypothesize that there may be an important role for setting a very high hormonal threshold for 
this cell differentiation, so that stressful events for the mother do not trigger cell differentiation in 
utero.  The stress of being born boosts the level of other catecholamine hormones and cortisol, 
which have been linked to organ development, including the gut (Cho and Norman 2013). It is 
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significant, then, that infants born via CS do not exhibit stress responses anywhere near those of 
naturally born children. 
III. DATA 
The rates of CS were calculated using data from the National Vital Statistics System 
(NVSS) Birth Data, which is a 100% sample of all birth certificates in the US.  I use all births 
from 1991-2004, which represents the intersection of publicly available data and years for which 
medical malpractice premium data could be obtained.  Rates were calculated for cells that were 
at the birthyear-state -MSA-gender-race level
2
, using the micro data found in the NVSS.  Rates 
of CS were also risk-adjusted, as per Baicker et al. (2006). A regression model of the probability 
that an infant was delivered via CS was estimated on a number of patient-level covariates as well 
as state x MSA fixed effects: 
CSi = a + b1Xi + b2(State x MSA) + ei     (1) 
The patient-level covariates, Xi,  include basic demographic variables, as well as many risk 
factors for CS, such as the age of the mother, birth weight, plurality of birth (e.g. twins), previous 
birth by CS, a range of mother morbidities, and complications of pregnancy as well as a range of 
possible complications that could occur during labor.  Separate regressions were run for each 
birthyear-gender-race cohort. After adding in the group mean, the coefficients on the (state x 
MSA) variables, b2, are the risk-adjusted regional rates of CS.  MSAs were further subdivided by 
state so that, for example, the portion of the New York MSA located in New Jersey is treated 
separately from the rest of the greater New York City area. This is an important distinction for 
my instrumental variable strategy as medical malpractice tort law varies at the state level and is 
an important factor in medical malpractice premiums.  
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 Interestingly, boys were significantly more likely to be born via CS in my data.  
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While risk-adjusting the rate of CS is not entirely necessary, given that CS will be 
instrumented for, I will use it in naïve OLS regressions first, which will provide a benchmark for 
my 2SLS results. Using the risk-adjusted rate of CS (RaCS) will provide a more meaningful 
benchmark as it takes into account some of the most obvious sources of endogeneity, such as 
infant and maternal health. Also, the RaCS is likely to be more sensitive to my instrument, since 
it is unlikely that changes in malpractice premiums will change the rate of medically necessary 
CS. 
Data on child health outcomes comes from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) Kids 
for years 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009.  The NIS Kids is part of a family of datasets collected and 
maintained by the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), which is sponsored by the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Unlike the general NIS, which includes 
annual inpatient data for adults, NIS Kids is only released every three years.  Data from 1997, the 
first year this data was released, was not used because it lacked county or zip code location 
information at the hospital level. The target universe for the NIS Kids is all discharge data from 
community hospitals for inpatients younger than 21 years old (AHRQ HCUP 2005).  The data 
contained in NIS KIDS represents a systematic 80% random sampling of a census of all 
community hospitals within a state designed to accurately represent the pediatric case-mix of 
each hospital. Data on hospital births are excluded as being out of the scope of this analysis.  
States that did not include hospital-level zip code data due to state privacy laws were dropped 
from the analysis.
3
  States that significantly limited the reported data more than the target 
universe were also excluded.
4
  The states included in each year of the data can be seen in Table 
                                                          
3
 Notably, this excluded California and Texas, among others. 
4
 After excluding states without hospital location data, this restriction also excluded Michigan, Georgia, and 
Virginia. 
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1.1. Only children born between 1991 and 2004, which are the years that intersect with publicly 
available NVSS data and malpractice premium data, are included. 
I construct two measures of child health using the NIS Kids data, the rate of 
hospitalization, and the rate of hospitalizations that present with asthma and other chronic 
pulmonary disease.  There is reason to suspect that total hospitalizations may be affected by CS, 
as there is evidence that CS may compromise a child’s immune system and make them more 
susceptible to a range of diseases (Hyde et al. 2012). The numerator for the rate of 
hospitalization is calculated using the number of observations in the NIS Kids in a birthyear-
state-MSA-gender-race cell. Asthma and other chronic pulmonary disease is also a good 
candidate because the mechanisms by which CS could increase the risk of asthma are well 
documented in the science and medical literature.  The numerator for the rate of hospitalizations 
that present with asthma and other chronic pulmonary disease is calculated using comorbidity 
software provided by HCUP, which creates measures of pre-existing chronic conditions based on 
the diagnosis coding of the ICD-9-CM.
5
   
For each of these health measures, there are up to four observations for a specific 
birthyear by location by demographics cohort. Each observation is of the cohort at a different age 
over the course of the four years of NIS Kids data. So, cohorts born from 1991 to 2004 are 
observed in the NIS Kids data in years 2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009, which creates a sample that 
is up to 18 years old. The sample skews young, with an average age of seven years old, and 
cohorts born in earlier years are observed more often. Each observation of the number of both 
total hospitalizations and those presenting with asthma and other chronic pulmonary diseases 
within a birthyear-state-MSA-gender-race cell has the same denominator: the number of total 
births in that cohort as calculated from the NVSS, which is a good approximation of the total 
                                                          
5
 The International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Edition, Clinical Modifications. 
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number of individuals in that cohort. Numerators were also scaled to represent a 100%. The total 
count of all cells, which equals the total births in the included states between 1991 and 2004, is 
over 30 million. This covers roughly half of all births per year, as calculated from the NVSS.  
Because these rates are potentially unreliable for smaller areas, only cells that contain 
greater than a 500 birth count—a proxy for total individuals in that cell—are included.  These 
constructed measures can be noisy, so the rates are Winsorized at the 99
th
 percentile, which does 
not change the general result. 
Data on medical malpractice insurance premiums comes from the Medical Liability 
Moniter (MLM), which is a national survey of insurers. I calculated average state-MSA level 
premiums as the premiums varied across MSAs within some states. Furthermore, the malpractice 
climate varies by state, which is the level regulations guiding malpractice insurance and tort 
reform.  
In order to assure that MSAs were consistently defined, I used the Geokorr2k: 
Geographic Correspondence Engine program, provided online by the Missouri Census Data 
Center.
6
  This software converts county FIPs and zip codes, in addition to other location data, to 
MSA codes based on definitions used for the 2000 Census, ensuring that the MSAs were defined 
consistently across all the years of data used.  
Table 1.2 contains weighted sample means across different age groups for some basic 
demographics, the rate of hospitalizations, and the rates of the co-morbidities conditional on 
having been hospitalized. The average of RaCS across all age groups is 16.14%; the average rate 
for older children is less because they were born in the early nineties. However, children who are 
less than one year old in my sample could have been born in any of the years for which I have 
NIS data, so the average rate of RaCS for this group is the average rate for the years 2000, 2003, 
                                                          
6
 http://mcdc2.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr2k.html 
 11 
 
2006, and 2009. The rate of asthma and other chronic pulmonary diseases, conditional on 
hospitalization, is generally consistent with national averages reported by the CDC (2013), with 
rates of roughly 10% for children ages 7-13 and a slight downtick for asthma in older children as 
some cases of asthma become asymptomatic after puberty.  
IV. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
a. OLS 
In order to verify that the general trends in the medical literature are also found in my 
data, I first look at naïve OLS regressions. These results should be interpreted only as simple 
correlations because they do not address any endogeneity issues and are likely to suffer from 
omitted variable bias.  I estimate the equation: 
Yi = α + β0RaCSi + Xi’ β + εi      (2) 
where subscript i denotes an observation of a cohort defined by birth year and MSA-state 
location. Again, there are up to four observations of a cohort at different ages, though they all 
have the same rate of risk-adjusted CS. Because each observation is an average rate, they are 
weighted by the cell count (Angrist and Pischke 2009). Y is an outcome variable that includes 
the rate of hospitalizations and the rates of those presenting with asthma and other chronic 
pulmonary diseases
7
, RaCS is the risk adjusted rate of CS, and X is a vector of characteristics, 
including gender, age dummies
8
, race, and birth year fixed effects. I include results for three 
different OLS specifications, which also contain state fixed effects or MSA fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state-MSA level for all models. 
 Looking at Table 1.3, there is a significant correlation between RaCS and the rate of 
hospitalizations across all the models. While the coefficients appear to be small, they indicate 
                                                          
7
 Note that this is different than the conditional rates shown in table 2.  
8
 The different age groupings are: less than 1 year old, 1-2 years old, 3-4 years old, 5-6 years old, 7-9 years old, 10-
13 years old, and 14-18 years old.  
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large increases compared to the mean. For example, using the smallest estimate found in column 
(1), a 10 percentage point increase in the rate of RaCS would increase the rate of hospitalizations 
by roughly half of a percentage point—more than a 20% increase compared to the mean, holding 
other predictors constant. There is also a strong and robust correlation between RaCS and asthma 
and other chronic pulmonary diseases. Columns (4) through (6) suggest that a 10 percentage 
point increase in the rate of RaCS would increase the rate of hospitalizations that also present 
with asthma from 14% to 23%, depending on the model specification, compared to the sample 
mean, holding other predictors constant.  
 The OLS results in Table 1.3 mirror the medical literature but are misleading as they 
don’t address any issues of endogeneity in the decision to have a cesarean section. For example, 
RaCS may be associated with risk factors not captured by the information in the NVSS and the 
risk adjustment, which could bias the estimates upwards. Alternatively, if RaCS is primarily 
driven by women from wealthier socioeconomic backgrounds choosing to undergo an elective 
procedure, the OLS could be downward biased. Children from wealthier backgrounds generally 
have lower incidences of asthma due to differences in environment, health behaviors, and 
incidence of illness (Bloom et al. 2012 and Adler et al. 1994). There is some evidence in the 
medical literature that white, privately insured women with more than a high school degree are 
more likely to induce labor, greatly increases the chance of CS (Coonrod et al. 2000). There is 
also the potential for bias due to measurement error, though the direction of this bias is less clear, 
because the rate of RaCS is calculated for a birth cohort and then linked with medical records for 
the same birthyear-state-MSA-gender-race group many years later. The degree to which the 
health measures cover the same individuals is not clear as families may move in and out of the 
 13 
 
area. Taken together, while the OLS estimates are clearly biased, the direction and source of the 
bias are unclear. 
b. INSTRUMENT VALIDITY 
In order to establish a causal relationship, I use medical liability pressure, as measured by 
malpractice insurance premiums, as an instrument for RaCS rates.  There is reason to think that 
CS is sensitive to medical malpractice premiums. The eight most common reasons for 
malpractice suits in obstetrics are all related to infant health, as opposed to maternal health, and 
six of these may involve an allegation of failure to perform CS or failure to perform the 
procedure in a timely manner (Minkoff 2012).  According to Cyr (2006), these types of 
allegations are so common that “physicians can hardly be blamed for practicing a ‘when in 
doubt, cut it out’ philosophy.”  
The literature that has focused on malpractice premiums specifically has generally found 
a significant and positive effect of premiums on CS.  Dubay et al. (1999) find that increases in 
malpractice premiums modestly increase the rate of CS.  Baicker et al. (2006) find that 
differences in medical malpractice liability, including premiums as one of their two measures, 
account for 14.8% of the regional variation in the rate of CS
9
.  The authors also show that 
regions with high rates of CS are performing less medically necessary procedures. There is also 
evidence in the medical literature suggesting that higher malpractice premiums are associated 
with significant, though relatively small, increases in the rate of CS (Murthy et al. 2007 and 
Yang et al. 2009). 
There is mixed evidence of the effect of malpractice liability, measured in other ways, on 
the use of CS. Currie and MacLeod (2009) find that caps on noneconomic damages, which 
                                                          
9
 Though Baicker andChandra (2005) find no significant effect of premiums on CS. 
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reduces the probability of a suit, actually increases the rate of CS, suggesting that doctors may be 
performing more procedures when liability is reduced because it is a more profitable procedure.  
Kim (2006) uses malpractice claims in other specialties as an instrument for malpractice claims 
in obstetrics and finds no impact on the rate of CS.  
I find a reasonably large effect of malpractice premiums on risk-adjusted CS rates, 
significant at the p<0.01 level.  I estimate that a 10% increase in premiums would increase the 
risk-adjusted rate of CS by about 4.1% relative to the sample mean. At 48.41, the F statistic for 
the first stage is also very large. These estimates are larger than those found in some of the 
previous literature because I use the risk-adjusted rate of CS, like Baicker et al. (2006), which is 
likely to be more sensitive to malpractice premiums since it already accounts for the medically 
necessary procedures unlikely to be induced by premium changes.  
Using insurance premiums as an instrument for CS would be problematic if premiums 
reflected the level of obstetrician care and the probability of a medical error, which could have 
an impact on later health outcomes. However, premiums appear to only be weakly linked to 
patient safety.  Due to the medical malpractice “crisis” of the early 2000s, there is a substantial 
amount of research on identifying the main drivers of increases in medical malpractice premiums 
over the years included in my data. The evidence suggests that larger market forces dictate the 
bulk of variation in liability premiums, as opposed to actual changes in the incidence of tort or 
patient safety.  Malpractice premiums across specialties are highly correlated and tend to rise in 
tandem, indicating that they are primarily driven by system-wide, state-level factors, as opposed 
to the incidence of medical errors in a specific area of medicine (Baicker and Chandra 2005).  
Furthermore, the frequency of claims remained stable over 1991-2003, suggesting no increase in 
the number of medical errors despite large increases in premiums (Chandra et al. 2005). While 
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payments for successful claims have increased over this period, increases in premiums are only 
weakly correlated with increases in claims payments and are not correlated with lags for claims 
payments (Baicker and Chandra 2005). Thus, the variation in liability premiums and the large 
increases seen in the early 2000s do not appear to reflect worsening medical care.  
Instead, it is widely thought that these changes in premiums reflected a fluctuation in the 
insurance cycle, moving from a “soft market” in the 1990s to a more constrained market with 
higher prices and reduced insurance supply in the 2000s (Mello 2006). These cycles in insurance 
underwriting practices are well documented, though the exact causes leading to the increase in 
medical malpractice premiums in the 2000s are still not well understood.  It appears that some of 
the largest contributors to the rapid hike in premiums include the rising price of reinsurance 
paired with large decreases in investment income (Thorpe 2004). Additionally, medical 
malpractice has a long lag, where claims take years to be settled, introducing more uncertainty 
into the premium calculation (Thorpe 2004).  
However, these explanations do not address the high degree of state-level variation seen 
in the data. The “crisis” itself was a state-level phenomenon and was limited to 10 out of 19 
states in my data set (Mello et al. 2003). Thorpe (2004) notes that there was also a large 
reduction in the number of firms offering medical liability insurance in these states as major 
carriers became insolvent and exited the market and shows that increases in the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index are significantly associated with increases in premiums. Many malpractice 
insurers only provide coverage to one or a small number of states, so exits in the market have a 
differential effect on insurance supply at the state level. There are also large state-level 
differences in tort law and the broader laws that regulate malpractice insurance. For example, 
some states require all proposed premium changes to be pre-approved by state regulators on a 
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case-by-case basis, while others let market forces work unfettered (Mello 2006). If insurers in 
these states were unable to adjust their prices quickly, they may have been less able to 
immediately offset their investment losses and their increased reinsurance costs, leading to larger 
future premium increases.  
 In order for this instrument to be valid, it must also not have an effect on later health 
outcomes through mechanisms other than CS. This condition could be violated if physicians 
perform the marginal procedures of CS much earlier than natural birth would occur, so that it is 
really reduced gestation time or lower birth weight driving the results. In order to test whether 
this occurs in my data, I use the NVSS to look at all of the births in the years and MSAs included 
in my analysis. I use the 5-minute Apgar score, which is a general measure of infant health and 
includes measures of heart rate, respiration, and neuromuscular function and is a good indicator 
of infant mortality (Casey et al. 2001). There is also a very strong relationship between 
gestational age and Apgar score, with preterm babies averaging very low scores. I find that 
premiums are not correlated with the 5-minute Apgar score, confirming the findings by Dubay et 
al. (1999).  Currie and McLeod (2009) also found that the marginal cesarean sections induced by 
tort reform had no impact on the 5minute Apgar score.  
 I do find that premiums are weakly correlated with babies considered to be very low 
birth weight (VLBW), defined as less than 1500 grams.  However, the estimate is almost 
precisely zero—a 10% increase in liability premiums is associated with a 0.006% increase in the 
probability of being in the VLBW category.  I also find a significant and larger effect on the 
probability of being considered low-birth weight (LBW), defined as weighing between 2500 and 
1500 grams, but it is still very small—a 10% increase in premiums is associated with a 0.3% 
increase in low weight babies. Since the same increase in premiums is associated with a 4% 
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increase in RaCS, it seems unlikely that the very small increase in LBW babies would be driving 
my results. I also find a weakly significant and nearly zero effect on the probability of being born 
premature, with a 10% increase in premiums increasing the probability of premature birth by 
0.01%.  
Using liability premiums as an instrument for CS could also be problematic if the supply 
of medical professionals decreases as the premiums increase. There is some evidence that, while 
this is unlikely to be true for other fields, it may be the case for obstetricians, who face much 
higher premiums than other medical specialties (Baicker and Chandra 2005, Mello et al. 2007). 
While it is reassuring that high premiums do not also indicate a constricted supply of doctors 
generally, making it unlikely that OB/Gyn premiums in the year of birth are correlated with 
reduced care from general practitioners later in life, it is possible that a decreased supply of 
obstetricians could impact the level of prenatal care received. This, in turn, could potentially 
impact later child health.  Dubay et al. (2001) address this issue and find that higher malpractice 
premiums lead to an increased prenatal care delay as well as fewer prenatal visits.  I replicate 
these findings for the states and years included in my data. However, the coefficients, while 
significant, are very small. I estimate that a 10% increase in malpractice premiums reduces the 
probability that a woman will receive prenatal care in the first trimester by 0.176%. I also find 
that there are no significant increases in foregoing prenatal care entirely and I estimate a 
precisely zero effect on delaying care until the third trimester, conditional on seeking prenatal 
care. Thus, the results suggest that there is a very small percentage shift in women from 
receiving care in the first trimester to receiving care in the second trimester.  This small effect, 
paired with nearly zero impact on infant health, suggest that increases in premiums are unlikely 
to affect later child health other than through increases in the rate of CS.  
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c. IV MODELS AND RESULTS 
The basic IV model that I estimate through 2SLS is: 
Yi = α + β0𝑅𝑎𝐶?̂?i+ Xi’ β + εi      (3) 
where subscript i denotes an observation at the birthyear-state-MSA-gender-race level and RaCSi 
is instrumented by medical malpractice premiums.  X is a vector of characteristics, including 
gender, age dummies, race, and birth year fixed effects. Observations are weighted according to 
cell size, and standard errors are clustered at the state-MSA level for all models. 
I also estimate 2SLS regressions that instrument for the interaction term between RaCS 
and age. For immune related diseases, we would expect the impact of CS to become less 
pronounced with age as factors like diet, illness, and antibiotic use also shape the gut 
microbiome and immune system (Guarner and Malagelada 2003). In order to capture this effect, 
I also estimate: 
Yi= α + β0RaCŜi+ β1(RaCSi * I_agei)̂  + Xi’ β + εi   (4) 
where all variables are defined as above and the interaction terms of RaCS and the indicator 
variables for the different age groupings are instrumented by the interaction of medical 
malpractice premiums and the age group indicator variables. The omitted group is those who are 
less than one year old.  
Table 1.4 presents the results for the 2SLS regressions with the rate of hospitalizations 
and the rate of those that presenting with asthma as the dependent variable.  The coefficient on 
the instrumented RaCS is very significant at the p<0.01 level in the first specification, without 
the age group interaction terms, and it becomes larger, though weakly significant, when these 
other covariates are included. The estimates are also very large relative to the sample mean. 
Using the coefficient in column (1), a 10 percentage point increase in RaCS, roughly a 60% 
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increase in the average rate of RaCS, would increase the rate of hospitalizations by about 50% 
across all age groups.  
The effect on the rate of hospitalizations that present with asthma or other chronic lung 
diseases is significant across both specifications. These effects are also very large relative to the 
sample mean, with a 10 percentage point increase in RaCS increasing the rate of hospitalizations 
with asthma by about 46% to 53% across all ages, depending on the coefficient used. Looking at 
column (4), it appears that this effect is greater for younger children, with a large and significant 
coefficient on the age interaction term for kids 1-2 years old. The coefficients on the age 
interaction terms are jointly significant at the 1% level, so the significance on the interaction with 
kids 1-2 years old is unlikely due to chance. The total effect of a 10 percentage point increase in 
RaCS for this age group would be roughly an 80% increase in the rate of hospitalizations that 
present with asthma. While these numbers seem very high, they are not unrealistic given the 
general trends seen in the US in recent years. Between 2001 and 2011, the rate of asthma grew 
by 28% (CDC 2013). Over that same period, the unadjusted rate of CS grew by about 34%, with 
the majority of that growth occurring in the earlier years (Martin et al. 2013 and Martin et al. 
2002).  
Given the above results, it is possible that increases in the rate of hospitalizations with 
asthma and other chronic pulmonary diseases could be driven mechanically by the increased rate 
of total hospitalizations if the rise in hospitalizations was unrelated to an increase in the 
incidence of the asthma or chronic pulmonary disease in the population. In order to demonstrate 
that there is a direct effect on the incidence of asthma and other chronic pulmonary disease, I 
restrict the analysis only to hospitalizations that list these as the primary reason for admission.  
This variable captures an entirely different population than the measure used thus far, which 
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captures asthma and chronic pulmonary disease as a pre-existing chronic illness and not as the 
primary diagnosis or the primary reason for admission. I create two variables: one that includes 
only asthma-specific diagnostic codes, and another that includes all of the diagnostic codes 
contained in the co-morbidity measure of chronic pulmonary diseases. Increases in these 
variables would only be caused by an increase in the number of hospital visits caused by asthma 
and an increase in the number of hospital visits caused by asthma and other chronic lung disease, 
respectively.   
The results are in Table 1.5. The coefficients on the instrumented RaCS are significant 
across specifications with and without age interaction terms. The coefficients, though small, 
mask even larger effects than when using the chronic illness measure. Using the estimate from 
column (1), a 10 percentage point increase in RaCS would more than double the rate of 
hospitalizations with asthma as the primary diagnosis. Using the estimate in column (3), the 
same increase would increase the rate of hospitalizations primarily for asthma and other chronic 
lung diseases by roughly 50%. The interaction terms are also significant and suggest a similar 
trend to those discussed in Table 1.4: the effect of RaCS is diminished as children grow older. 
Because these variables are constructed using only primary diagnostics, as opposed to the co-
morbidity measures, these increases are caused by an increase in hospitalizations caused by 
asthma and other chronic lung diseases, suggesting that the incidence of these illnesses has 
increased due to CS. 
V. ROBUSTNESS 
In order to further verify that the increases in hospitalizations and those that present with 
asthma are driven by CS, I will run a placebo test, using an outcome that is a priori unrelated to 
CS. However, finding such an outcome is difficult, as some of the better documented pathways, 
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such as impact on the flora of the gut or the epigenetic consequences of an extreme hormonal 
stress response, could have impacts on health other than just through the immune system. The 
influence of the gut biome is a relatively recent and rapidly expanding field of study that has 
linked the gut biome to many different health outcomes. There is a well-documented 
“bidirectional neurohumoral communication system, known as the gut–brain axis, [that] 
integrates the host gut and brain activities” (Collins et al. 2012). There is evidence, often coming 
out of animal trials, that gut bacteria can have an impact on a huge number of outcomes, such as 
anxiety, depression, autism, irritable bowel syndrome, memory, and liver disease (Collins et al. 
2012). CS has also been correlated with other later health outcomes, such as obesity, cancers, 
and skeletal diseases, though the evidence is weaker and the mechanism is less clear (Cho and 
Norman 2013). Furthermore, some of the more obvious candidates, like trauma and fractures, 
could be influenced by the activity level of the child, which could be greatly affected by asthma.  
I find one class of hospitalizations, patients suffering from burns, that I expect to be 
completely unrelated to the rate of CS or the rate of asthma and other chronic pulmonary 
diseases. Table 1.6 contains the results from the 2SLS models with the rate of hospitalizations 
due to burns as the outcome variable. Reassuringly, I find no significant effect of the 
instrumented rate of RaCS on the rate of hospitalizations due to burns using either specification. 
Furthermore, the coefficients on the age interaction terms in column (2) are also jointly not 
significant.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The effect of CS on the rate of total hospitalizations and the rate of hospitalizations that 
also present with asthma and other chronic pulmonary diseases is robust and large. This is an 
important finding since both the rate of CS and the rate of asthma have increased dramatically 
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over recent years. Between 1996 and 2009, the unadjusted rate of CS rose by 11.6 percentage 
points (Martin et al. 1996 and Martin et al. 2009), while the rate of asthma increased by roughly 
28% between 2001 and 2011 (CDC 2013). Although the coefficient estimates are small in 
absolute size, they are large compared to the sample means. The effect on the rate of 
hospitalizations that present with asthma and other chronic pulmonary disease is particularly 
high among younger children.  
These effects are a negative externality of CS. With high malpractice premiums, doctors 
are further incentivized to perform more cesarean sections than are medically necessary. These 
excess procedures not only cost more in direct medical spending but also significantly increase 
the infant’s probability of being hospitalized later in life, resulting in further increases in medical 
costs. There are also significant economic costs associated with asthma, both in terms of direct 
medical spending, and from lost schooling and other impacts on the development of human 
capital. The total cost of asthma was estimated to be $56 billion for the year 2007 alone (Barnett 
and Nurmagambetov 2011).  
This study is a strong, yet initial, start to understanding the causal connection between CS 
and later health outcomes. There is much future research to be done on this topic. There could 
also be a large effect of CS on other variables of economic interest, such as adult income or 
education, that would allow for better measurement of the social cost of medically unnecessary 
procedures. Additional research is also needed to understand the mechanisms behind the findings 
presented here, as this study is unable to distinguish between them. Understanding the 
mechanisms could allow doctors to mitigate the negative long term health effects of medically 
necessary procedures. 
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VIII. TABLES  
 
Table 1.1: Final states from NIS Kids 
NIS Kids 
data year 
States included in 
analysis  
2000 
AZ, CO, FL, IA, KY, 
MD, MA, NC, NJ, NY, 
OR, PA, UT, WA, WI 
2003 + IL, NH, NV, VT       
-  PA 
2006 Same as 2003 
2009 + PA 
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Table 1.2: Weighted Sample Means by Age Group 
Age group: 0-18 <1 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-9 10-13 14-18 
Risk-adjusted CS 0.161 0.165 0.176 0.192 0.170 0.163 0.151 0.126 
Rate of hospitalizations 0.024 0.052 0.023 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.020 0.025 
Asthma and chronic 
pulmonary disease, 
conditional on hospitalized 
0.094 0.016 0.073 0.094 0.104 0.101 0.103 0.098 
Female 0.487 0.488 0.487 0.487 0.487 0.486 0.486 0.487 
African American 0.156 0.154 0.158 0.158 0.146 0.158 0.154 0.163 
Other race 0.036 0.040 0.043 0.039 0.036 0.039 0.031 0.027 
Number of cells 7782 349 803 970 1129 1880 1591 1060 
Weighted Obs  33,434,036 1,367,059 3,599,553 4,125,730 608,696 8,384,847 6,739,929 4,608,222 
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Table 1.3 : The effect of risk adjusted CS on health outcomes: OLS 
 
Hospitalizations 
 
Asthma, chronic lung disease 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
RaCS 0.0535** 0.0400*** 0.0365*** 
 
0.0046** 0.0031*** 0.0027*** 
  (0.0219) (0.0121) (0.0100)   (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
Controls yes  yes  yes  
 
yes  yes  yes  
Birthyear FE yes  yes yes 
 
yes  yes yes 
State FE 
 
yes  yes 
  
yes  yes 
MSA FE     yes        yes  
Observations 7,782 7,782 7,782 
 
7,782 7,782 7,782 
R-squared 0.616 0.660 0.698 
 
0.498 0.547 0.592 
Note: The unit of observation is the birthyear-state-MSA-gender-race cell. Cells are weighted 
proportional to cell count. All regressions also included the covariates: female; age dummies; African 
American; other race. All standard errors are clustered at the state-MSA level. Stars indicate: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.4:  The effect of risk adjusted CS on health outcomes using 2SLS 
 
Hospitalizations   
Asthma, Chronic Lung 
Disease 
  (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
          
RaCS 0.1230*** 0.1830* 
 
0.0104*** 0.0092** 
 
(0.0451) (0.1100) 
 
(0.0033) (0.0043) 
Age 1-2 x RaCS 
 
0.0142 
  
0.0068** 
  
(0.0867) 
  
(0.0035) 
Age 3-4 x RaCS 
 
-0.0889 
  
0.0012 
  
(0.0841) 
  
(0.0024) 
Age 5-6 x RaCS 
 
-0.103 
  
-0.0004 
  
(0.0787) 
  
(0.0026) 
Age 7-9 x RaCS 
 
-0.0982 
  
0.0005 
  
(0.0882) 
  
(0.0028) 
Age 10-13 x RaCS 
 
-0.0975 
  
-0.0023 
  
(0.0770) 
  
(0.0037) 
Age 14-18 x RaCS 
 
0.143 
  
0.0091 
  
(0.1560) 
  
(0.0101) 
Controls yes yes   yes yes 
Birthyear FE yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Observations 7,782 7,782   7,782 7,782 
Note: The unit of observation is the birthyear-state-MSA-gender-race cell. 
Cells are weighted proportional to cell count. All regressions also included the 
covariates: female; age dummies; African American; other race. Less than 1 
year old is the omitted age group. All standard errors are clustered at the state-
MSA level. Stars indicate: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.5: 2SLS; The effect of RaCS on Primary Diagnosis 
      
 
Asthma Only   
Asthma and Other Lung 
Disease 
  (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
          
RaCS 0.0004*** 0.0008** 
 
0.0118*** 0.0155*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0003) 
 
(0.0042) (0.0047) 
Age 1-2 x RaCS 
 
0.0001 
  
0.0104* 
  
(0.0003) 
  
(0.0058) 
Age 3-4 x RaCS 
 
-0.0006** 
  
0.0000 
  
(0.0003) 
  
(0.0068) 
Age 5-6 x RaCS 
 
-0.0007** 
  
-0.0051 
  
(0.0003) 
  
(0.0032) 
Age 7-9 x RaCS 
 
-0.0005* 
  
-0.0066* 
  
(0.0003) 
  
(0.0039) 
Age 10-13 x RaCS 
 
-0.0007** 
  
-0.0115*** 
  
(0.0003) 
  
(0.0034) 
Age 14-18 x RaCS 
 
-0.0002 
  
-0.0150*** 
  
(0.0004) 
  
(0.0036) 
Controls yes yes   yes yes 
Birthyear FE yes yes 
 
yes yes 
Observations 7,782 7,782   7,782 7,782 
Note: The unit of observation is the birthyear-state-MSA-gender-race cell. Cells are 
weighted proportional to cell count. All regressions also included the covariates: 
female; age dummies; African American; other race. Less than 1 year old is the 
omitted age group. All standard errors are clustered at the state-MSA level. Stars 
indicate: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.6: Placebo test using 2SLS 
 
 
Hospitalizations 
due to burns 
  (1) (2) 
 
    
RaCS 0.0005 0.0015 
 
(0.0004) (0.0014) 
Age 1-2 x RaCS 
 
0.0001 
 
 
(0.0004) 
Age 3-4 x RaCS 
 
-0.0009 
 
 
(0.0009) 
Age 5-6 x RaCS 
 
-0.0010 
 
 
(0.0013) 
Age 7-9 x RaCS 
 
-0.0014 
 
 
(0.0015) 
Age 10-13 x 
RaCS 
 
-0.0017 
 
 
(0.0016) 
Age 14-18 x 
RaCS 
 
-0.0013 
 
 
(0.0013) 
Controls yes yes 
Birthyear FE yes yes 
Observations 7,782 7,782 
Note: The unit of observation is the 
birthyear-state-MSA-gender-race cell. Cells 
are weighted proportional to cell count. All 
regressions also included the covariates: 
female; age dummies; African American; 
other race. Less than 1 year old is the 
omitted age group. All standard errors are 
clustered at the state-MSA level. Stars 
indicate: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CHAPTER 2 
FINANCIAL DISTRESS, MATERNAL STRESS, AND INFANT HEALTH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, foreclosure filings were up 81% compared to the previous year and up 225% 
compared to 2006 (Christie, 2009). More than 3.1 million foreclosure filings were issued during 
2008 and 861,664 families lost their homes that year, according to RealtyTrac, a leading real 
estate company that deals in foreclosed homes (Christie, 2009).   
This event, which has been called the “foreclosure crisis,” was also a large financial shock 
for families, one that has been used to analyze the causal effect of a negative wealth shock on 
adult health (Currie and Tekin, 2015). However, there has been no work done looking at the 
effect of an exogenous negative financial shock on infant health, though there are reasons to 
suspect that such an effect is likely. Financial stress could increase maternal stress, change access 
to prenatal care, and impact maternal behaviors such as smoking, among other channels that link 
negative financial shocks to infant health. 
This paper is the first to analyze the effect of a negative financial shock on infant health, 
using regional variation in financial stress caused by the foreclosure crisis. Using data from 2005 
to 2011, I find strong evidence across multiple specifications that financial stress increases the 
number of infants born prematurely. A 10 percentage point increase in the mortgage delinquency 
rate, for example, would lead to an increase in premature births of approximately 5%. 
Additionally, I find some evidence that high rates of mortgage delinquency lead to decreased 
birth and an increase in admissions to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU). I also provide 
evidence that the negative relationship between mortgage delinquency and infant health is 
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partially driven by worsening prenatal care and increases in the intensity of smoking during the 
third trimester.  
In order to estimate the effect of a large, negative, financial shock, I exploit variation in 
the county-level percent of individuals with mortgage debt that is 90 or more days delinquent, as 
a measure of financial stress. The external factors that led to the foreclosure crisis also increased 
the number of individuals who were delinquent on their mortgage payments, which is a precursor 
to foreclosure proceedings. An increase in predatory lending practices, the expansion of the 
subprime mortgage market, and the sudden increases in variable interest rates that were followed 
by the rapid contraction of credit markets were all factors, exogenous to infant health, which led 
to large increases in the mortgage delinquency rate (Currie and Tekin, 2015). Additionally, 
Palmer (2015) finds that delinquency and default were driven to a large degree by a reduction in 
housing prices that were unrelated to the expansion of the sub-prime market or changes in 
borrower characteristics. Rather, large housing price decreases were exogenous to family 
characteristics and led to negative equity, which increased the rate of foreclosure. 
Similarly, given that unemployment and mortgage delinquency move in opposite 
directions for several years covered by the data, it is unlikely that mortgage delinquency was 
driven by increases in unemployment during this time. The difference between a financial shock 
and an unemployment shock is important in this context, as unemployment increases maternal 
leisure time, which has been shown to improve infant health, obscuring a possible wealth effect 
(Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004). The large changes in mortgage delinquency that occurred 
over this time period represent an exogenous shock, increasing financial stress and decreasing 
liquidity for households.  
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The negative impact that the foreclosure crisis had on infant health is an important 
contribution to the understanding of the impact of wealth on health, as it shows the impact of a 
large and exogenous negative financial shock on infant health and also suggests through which 
mechanisms this relationship is established. The negative effect of financial stress on infant 
health also represents another cost of such crises, which should be taken in to consideration when 
crafting policy and designing programs meant to provide financial relief to families. 
Additionally, there may be important gaps in programs to provide prenatal care to financially 
stressed mothers as well as large infant health gains to be made by strengthening smoking 
cessation programs targeted towards pregnant women.  
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section II contains relevant background, 
including a full discussion of the ways in which an increase in foreclosure could worsen infant 
health. Section III describes the data, Section IV discusses the empirical specification, and 
Section V contains the results for the impact on infant health. Section VI contains an exploration 
of the possible mechanisms underlying the relationship between the foreclosure crisis, and 
negative wealth shocks in general, on infant health. Section VII concludes.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 was preceded by a large increase in foreclosures, with rates 
rising by a staggering amount each year. By mid-2008, the share of loans that were seriously 
delinquent or beginning the foreclosure process was nearly double the previous record, since the 
Mortgage Bankers Association began collecting such data in the 1970s (USHUD, 2010). 
Recently, this period of rapid increase in the foreclosure rate was used by Currie and Tekin 
(2015) in order to evaluate the impact on adult health outcomes. In addition to being a very 
stressful event for the families being foreclosed on, they viewed the increasing foreclosure rate 
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as a wealth shock, bringing down property values of surrounding homes. While the size of the 
effect is debated, it has been established that foreclosed homes directly reduce the property 
values of surrounding homes (Schuetz et al., 2008; Calomiris et al., 2008; Campbell et al., 2011; 
Immergluck and Smith, 2006; and Harding et al., 2009). 
 In addition to being a wealth shock, Currie and Tekin (2015) find that there were large 
increases in the foreclosure rate that preceded increases in the unemployment rate. In fact, they 
found that as foreclosure rates were rising between 2005 and 2007, unemployment rates were 
decreasing, a trend which is also found in my data. This distinction between a wealth shock and 
an unemployment shock is important, as unemployment and the resulting increase in leisure time 
has been shown to improve health outcomes by decreasing the mortality rate among adults and 
by improving physical health (Rhum, 2000; 2003; 2005), and improving health outcomes of 
infants (Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004). However, Miller et al. (2009) argue that, for adults, 
the cyclical changes in mortality are unlikely to be related to changes in health behaviors, since 
they are concentrated primarily among the young and the old, as opposed to adults of working 
age.  
 Currie and Tekin (2015) find that increases in the zip code level foreclosure rate reduce 
adult health. They find increases in unscheduled visits for preventable conditions and a broad 
array of other conditions such as heart attacks, stroke, urinary tract infections, gastro-intestinal 
problems, chest pain and dysrythmias. They also find a significant effect on a variety of mental 
health conditions and suicides. An increase of 100 foreclosures, for example, would increase 
hospital admissions for anxiety by 9.2% among 20-49 year olds. Given that many individuals 
who suffer from mental health crises are not admitted to ERs or hospitals, this is quite a large 
effect.  
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There has been some work towards understanding wealth shock and the possible effect 
on infant health. Lindo (2011) looks at paternal job displacement and found that it has a negative 
impact on the birth weight of all subsequent children of displaced workers. While Lindo (2011) 
considers a negative wealth shock, in the sense that paternal unemployment does not directly 
increase maternal leisure, it uses a relatively small sample and includes all types of job 
separation, not just those that were exogenous. The analysis presented here is the first to analyze 
the effect of a plausibly exogenous negative wealth shock on infant health.  
Hoynes et al. (2015) use increases in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) as a positive 
wealth shock and find that increases in the EITC result in increased mean birth weight and a 
decreased incidence of low birth weight. Their work suggests that the most likely mechanisms 
are through increased prenatal care and reductions in smoking, though the quality of prenatal 
care may also have improved through a shift from public to private insurance coverage. While 
increases in the EITC are likely to reduce stress, the effect of a positive shock on stress is likely 
to be much less than that of a negative wealth shock. Not only do people generally respond more 
to negative events than positive ones (Baumeister et al., 2001), but increases in mortgage 
delinquency could lead to significant financial distress, such as fear of foreclosure. The analysis 
presented here captures the negative effect on infant health of a negative financial shock as well 
as maternal stress caused by financial stress. Knowing the effect of such stress could be very 
useful for estimating the impact of a recession on population health.  
There are several channels through which it is possible that financial stress may impact 
the health of infants. The first is that the physical health of mothers could be impacted, leading to 
conditions like hypertension and diabetes (Currie and Tekin, 2015), which can complicate 
pregnancies.  
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Infant health may also be affected by increases in maternal stress levels. There is a fairly 
large medical literature concerning this (see Beydoun and Saftlas, 2008, for a comprehensive 
review) and the majority of the studies conducted have found that maternal stress increases the 
probability that an infant will be born preterm, under weight for gestational age, and is more 
likely to have low birth weight (less than 2500 grams). More recent work has also shown that 
prenatal stress and anxiety predicted a considerable amount of the variance in infant illnesses and 
antibiotic use (Beijers et al., 2010).  
There is evidence that mental health worsens as unemployment rises (Charles and DeCicca, 
2008; Rhum, 2003) in addition to Currie and Tekin’s (2015) findings that the foreclosure crisis, 
in particular, was bad for mental health. Though, to my knowledge, there are no studies 
regarding the effect of macroeconomic conditions on maternal stress levels, in particular.   
A shock to foreclosures may also impact infant health by changing maternal behaviors, 
though there is mixed evidence as to whether activities that are detrimental to health are 
procyclical or countercyclical and all of the literature relies on variation in unemployment as 
opposed to any credible wealth shock. Alcohol consumption has been shown to decrease among 
heavy drinkers, while increasing among light drinkers as unemployment rises, (Rhum and Black, 
2002). However, Dee (2001) and Deb et al. (2011) found that alcohol consumption significantly 
increased when unemployment rose and Charles and DeCicca (2008) found no effect of 
unemployment on alcohol consumption. Similarly, the evidence for whether obesity and physical 
activity are procyclical or counter cyclical is mixed (Rhum 2005; Charles and DeCicca, 2008; 
Deb, 2011; Bӧckerman et al., 2007).  
The economics literature regarding the link between cigarette consumption and 
unemployment is clearer, with several studies concluding that the intensity of smoking increases 
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when employment is high and decreases among heavy smokers when it is low (Charles and 
DeCicca, 2008; Rhum, 2005; Xu, 2013). Rhum (2005) also concludes that decreases in times of 
high unemployment are unlikely to be related to income reductions. The medical literature, 
however, suggests that smoking increases in times of financial stress (Kouvonen et al., 2005; 
Siahpush and Carlin, 2006; Steptoe et al., 1996) and when individuals become unemployed 
(Falba et al., 2005). 
A financial shock may also impact access to health care and utilization of prenatal care, 
though it is unclear whether it would reduce access or increase it. Access to prenatal care could 
be increased if more women who did not previously have access to health insurance now qualify 
for public programs, such as Medicaid and the State Child Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP). 
Prenatal care could be reduced if more women lose private insurance and do not qualify for 
public insurance or if public insurance provides less intensive coverage than private insurance.  
Finally, there could be a selection effect as the foreclosure crisis could impact the decision to 
become pregnant differentially among women, based on observable characteristics. Dehejia and 
Lleras-Muney (2004) found that unemployment increased the share of less educated white 
women and increased the share of black women who were of higher socioeconomic background.  
III. DATA 
Data on infant health outcomes and parental characteristics comes from the National 
Vital Statistics System (NVSS) Birth Data, which is a 100% census of all birth certificates in the 
US. My primary outcome variables are very broad measures of infant health, which capture 
changes in gestation
10
, birth weight, 5-minute Apgar score
11
, admission to the Neonatal Intensive 
Care Unit (NICU), and the need for ventilation immediately following birth. I create some 
                                                          
10
 Gestation is the period of time spent in the womb, from conception to birth, measured in weeks.  
11
 The 5-minute Apgar score is a general measure of infant health and includes measures of heart rate, respiration, 
and neuromuscular function and is a good indicator of infant mortality (Casey et al. 2001). 
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categorical variables from these health measures, including low Apgar (scoring less than or equal 
to 6 on a scale to 10), low birth weight (less than 2500 grams), very low birth weight (less than 
1500 grams), and premature (less than 37 weeks gestation). These definitions come from the 
NVSS Natality codebook. In addition to infant health outcomes, birth certificates contain data on 
parental characteristics, such as age, marital status, race, and education, prenatal care, and 
maternal behavior, such as smoking and drinking.   
I was granted access to the limited geography data, which contains county identifiers for 
all counties with more than 100,000 residents. I use all births in these counties from the years 
2005 to 2011, which are the years that cover the financial crisis and contain certain infant health 
outcomes, like admission to the NICU and ventilator use, that are not contained in earlier years. 
Data has been aggregated to the county level by either year or quarter and frequency weighted by 
the number of births.  
My primary independent variable is the county-level percent of individuals with 
mortgage debt that is 90 or more days delinquent, observed in the fourth quarter of each year, 
which I use as a measure of financial stress. The mortgage delinquency data comes from tables 
compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank New York using the Consumer Credit Panel, which is a 
5% random sample of all individuals in the US who have credit reports with Equifax.
12
   
As another measure of the mortgage delinquency and financial stress, I use the quarterly 
vacancy rate from the US Postal Service (USPS), which began collection of this data in the 
fourth quarter of 2005. As noted in Currie and Tekin (2015), this variable captures general 
community disinvestment as well, since there is no way to distinguish between commercial and 
residential vacancy in the time period under consideration. Community investment is a factor in 
                                                          
12
 This data was downloaded from http://www.newyorkfed.org/ on March 20, 2015, but has since been removed.  
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determining housing values, however, and a large shock to the commercial areas could also 
reflect a decrease in housing wealth in the area. In order to keep the vacancy variable comparable 
to mortgage delinquency, I calculate it as vacancies per person using the population estimates 
used to calculate delinquency, as opposed to as a percentage of all properties. I only consider 
properties that are newly vacant for up to one year. This data is also particularly useful because it 
is observed quarterly, which will allow me to look at the timing of shocks on infant health 
outcomes more precisely.  
A property is designated as vacant by the USPS if mail has gone uncollected for 90 days 
or more. This data is observed at the zip code level, but was aggregated to the county level using 
the Geokorr12: Geographic Correspondence Engine program, provided online by the Missouri 
Census Data Center.13 Data from the year 2010 has been omitted from the analysis, since the mass 
mailing of census documents caused a very large spike in the number of properties that were 
considered vacant.  
Data on county-level unemployment was obtained from the Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics, through the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Nearly all counties with more than 100,000 
residents are in the final data set, representing all the states.
14
 Despite losing some variation by 
aggregating at the county level, there is still massive variation in the extent of the foreclosure 
crisis across the country.  
Summary statistics can be found in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The mean mortgage delinquency 
rate is 4.13, with a standard deviation of 4.26.  Out of 4,089 county-years, approximately 5.5% 
of them have a mortgage delinquency rate of over 10%. Because these counties tend to be larger, 
more than 2.3 million births occurred in these high delinquency rate county-years. The vacancy 
                                                          
13
 http://mcdc.missouri.edu/websas/geocorr12.html 
14
 Four counties were omitted because they had incomplete unemployment data. Of these, three were in 
Mississippi.  
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rate is considerably lower, at 1.10%, with a standard deviation of 0.79. This difference may 
capture the fact that many individuals who are delinquent on their mortgage debt have not been 
foreclosed upon and houses that have been foreclosed upon may not be vacant for some time. 
Because this measure considers commercial properties as well, the true rate of residential 
vacancies is probably even lower. However, there is significant variation in this measure across 
counties over time as well, as the foreclosure crisis worsened.  
In addition to providing means for the entire sample, I have also broken out racial and 
ethnic subgroups. It is useful to consider these separately as there are widely known health 
differences among these groups. Additionally, it is likely that the foreclosure crisis was worse for 
minority groups, who may have been disproportionately targeted for predatory sub-prime loans 
(Currie and Tekin, 2015). White mothers fair better in regards to educational attainment and 
prenatal care utilization, though prenatal care is very high across all groups. White mothers also 
have the highest rates of smoking during pregnancy. Hispanic infants have better health 
outcomes, on average, with the lowest rates of being born with low birth weight (under 2500 
grams) or very low birth weight (under 1500 grams), as well as low rates of ventilation and 
admission to the NICU. 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
My primary independent variable of interest is delinquency, which reflects the percentage 
of individuals with mortgage debt that is 90 or more days delinquent and is observed in the 
fourth quarter of each year. Mortgage delinquency follows the same trends of the foreclosure rate 
as described by Currie and Tekin (2015) and increases over the years 2005-2007 while 
unemployment is still declining, suggesting that increases in county-level mortgage delinquency 
are not caused by increases in county-level unemployment.  
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The external factors that led to the foreclosure crisis also increased the number of 
individuals who were delinquent on their mortgage payments, which is a precursor to foreclosure 
proceedings. An increase in predatory lending practices, the expansion of the subprime mortgage 
market, and the sudden increases in variable interest rates that were followed by the rapid 
contraction of credit markets were all factors exogenous to health that led to large increases in 
the mortgage delinquency rate (Currie and Tekin, 2015).  
Though mortgage delinquency in itself is unlikely to affect housing prices in a 
neighborhood, there is evidence that delinquency and default were driven to a large degree by a 
reduction in housing prices that were unrelated to the expansion of the sub-prime market or 
changes in borrower characteristics (Palmer, 2015). Palmer (2015) found that 40% of the 
difference in default rates between homeowners in 2003-2004 and homeowners in 2006-2007, 
who were 3 times as likely to default, could be attributed to increases in sub-prime lending and 
differences in borrower characteristics. Nearly all the remaining cohort difference was 
attributable to housing price declines that were unrelated to the expansion of the sub-prime 
mortgage market. In order to account for the endogeneity of housing prices, the author 
instruments for housing prices with long-run regional variation in house-price cyclicality and 
constructs a model that explains 95% of the cohort differences. Given the many factors that have 
been implicated as leading to high rates of mortgage default, it is very unlikely that high county-
level mortgage delinquency rates are being driven by changes in infant health. Currie and Tekin 
(2015) note that it is very unlikely that high foreclosure rates are being driven by “a sudden 
epidemic of ill health among the U.S. population.” They also note that while many have said that 
the crisis was unavoidable in retrospect, the severity and timing of the financial crisis was a 
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surprise to nearly all (Currie and Tekin, 2015). Changes in mortgage delinquency over this time 
period represent an exogenous shock, increasing financial stress for households.  
I estimate a series of models that relates this measure of financial distress to various 
infant health outcomes, as well as mother characteristics, behaviors, and prenatal care utilization. 
The model employed is: 
𝑌𝑐𝑡 =   𝛼 +  𝛽0𝐷𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑈𝑐𝑡 +  𝛾𝑐 +  𝛿𝑠𝑡 +  𝜀𝑐𝑡          (1) 
where 𝑌𝑐𝑡 is the outcome of interest aggregated to county c and observed at time t. For infant 
health outcomes, as well as maternal behaviors (i.e. smoking, excessive weight gain, etc), t is 
determined by the fourth quarter observation that is closest to the majority of the pregnancy. So, 
for example, a child born in Feb. 2006 will be linked with the fourth quarter delinquency data for 
2005. This is done in order to reflect the consensus in the medical literature that stress and 
negative health behaviors like smoking most impact health outcomes at birth during the second 
and third trimesters, however the results very little if simply the year of birth is used. When 
looking at maternal characteristics, however, t will be determined by the date of conception. The 
primary variable of interest 𝐷𝑐𝑡, delinquency, is also observed at the county-year t level. 𝑈𝑐𝑡 is 
the fourth quarter unemployment rate, linked to infant and mother data in the same way as 
delinquency.  
County fixed effects are captured by 𝛾𝑐, so identification comes from changes within a 
county over time. 𝛿𝑠𝑡 is a vector of indicators for each state and year combination. These fixed 
effects will control for any time varying state level factors that may be relevant to the foreclosure 
rate and to health, such as state level relief programs. The idiosyncratic random error term is 
captured by 𝜀𝑐𝑡. All regressions are weighted by the number of births in a county at time t and 
standard errors are clustered at the county level.  
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When using quarterly vacancy data collected by the USPS, the model becomes: 
𝑌𝑐𝑞𝑡 =   𝛼 +  𝛽0𝑉𝑐𝑞𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑈𝑐𝑞𝑡 +  𝛾𝑐𝑞 +  𝛿𝑠𝑡 +  𝜀𝑐𝑞𝑡          (2) 
where the outcome variable is observed in county c in quarter q of year t. 𝑉𝑐𝑞𝑡 is the primary 
variable of interest, the county level vacancy rate at the quarter-year level. Unemployment, 𝑈𝑐𝑞𝑡, 
is also observed quarterly at the county level. The vector of county fixed effects, 𝛾𝑐𝑞 , now 
contains an indicator variable for each county-quarter combination, capturing any seasonal 
component to foreclosures or to infant health outcomes. 𝛿𝑠𝑡 is a vector of indicators for each 
state and time combination and  𝜀𝑐𝑞𝑡 is the idiosyncratic random error term. Again, standard 
errors are clustered at the county level and regressions are weighted by the number of births in 
each county-quarter-year cell.  
V. RESULTS 
The results of my basic specification can be found in Table 2.3. I find a significant 
negative effect of mortgage delinquency on the probability of being born premature, needing to 
be ventilated for some time after birth (though not for more than 6 hours), and being admitted to 
the NICU. While these estimates appear very small, they represent large percentage changes, 
especially given the high variation of mortgage delinquency. The mean difference in the 
foreclosure rate from the lowest rate observed to the highest rate within a county over time was 
5.7 percentage points with a standard deviation of 4.5 percentage points. A 10 percentage point 
increase in the rate of mortgage delinquency would lead to a 4.6% increase in the number of 
babies born premature, a staggering 30.7% increase in the number of infants needing ventilation 
for short periods of time, and a nearly 10% increase in the number of infants admitted to the 
NICU. While these percentage increases are large due to the relatively small means of these 
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variables, these outcomes are also among the most severe for infant health. Consistent with the 
results for premature births, the coefficient on delinquency is also significant for gestation. 
In order to address concerns about the specification and the possible multicollinearity of 
delinquency and unemployment, I calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) (Mansfield and 
Helms, 1982) and find that it is between 1.5 and 3.5 across all the regressions, which is well 
below the 10, the traditional cutoff. The correlation between the two variables is 0.68.  
I also estimate the model separately for each variable. The results can be found in Tables 
2.4 and 2.5. The estimates and the levels of significance do not radically change for the 
coefficients of delinquency when estimated alone. It is interesting to compare the negative and 
weakly significant estimates for unemployment to those found in Dehejia and Lleras-Muney 
(2004), though. The primary difference in specification is that I use county level data, while they 
employed state level data and found that unemployment improved infant health outcomes. The 
lack of positive results in my model may stem from the difference in the level of aggregation, or 
it may be a distinct feature of the financial crisis not found in 1975 to 1999, the years they 
consider.  
In Table 2.6, I consider the three main racial/ethnic subgroups considered in the summary 
statistics. There is evidence that subprime loans were targeted more towards low-income 
minority groups, who may have been more affected by the foreclosure crisis (Bocian, Ernst, and 
Li, 2008; Mayer and Pence, 2008). The crisis may also have impacted these groups more due to 
lower savings, higher baseline unemployment, lower rates private insurance coverage, and worse 
baseline health (Currie and Tekin, 2015).  
I find the largest negative impact of delinquency on the health of black infants, with 
significant negative coefficients for birth weight, very low birth weight, low 5-minute Apgar, 
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gestation, and admittance to the NICU. A 10 percentage point increase in county level 
delinquency would cause roughly a 5% increase in the number of infants born into the very low 
birth weight category. Similarly, the impact on the average 5-minute Apgar score is significant, 
but small, however there is a relatively large increase in the probability of being in the low 5-
minute Apgar category. The 5-minute Apgar score is a general measure of infant health and 
includes measures of heart rate, respiration, and neuromuscular function and is a good indicator of 
infant mortality (Casey et al. 2001). The effect on NICU admission is also particularly high and a 10 
percentage point increase in mortgage delinquency would result in a 12.8% increase in NICU 
admissions.  
Delinquency coefficients for premature, gestation, and admittance to the NICU were 
significant or weakly significant across all the subgroups. The estimate for the effect of 
delinquency on being born premature was especially large for the Hispanic subgroup, suggesting 
that a 10 percentage point increase in mortgage delinquency would result in a 7.5% increase in 
the number of infants in this category. Ventilation after birth was significant and relatively large 
for whites and Hispanics.  
I consider my alternative proxy measure for foreclosure, the per capita vacancy rate, in 
Table 2.7. Because this data is collected quarterly, I am able to pair it with the different 
trimesters of pregnancy, using the month of the last menses as the conception month, which is 
standard medical practice. The large difference in observations stems from the exclusion of much 
of 2005, which is not in the data, as well as all of 2010, which precluded inclusion of children 
born in a roughly 9 month timeframe after that as well. The USPS data is a complete zip code 
level census, however, so there was no systematic exclusion of counties based on other factors.  
I am able to generally replicate the results of Table 2.3, estimating a significant effect of 
the vacancy rate on being born premature, gestation time, and birth weight. The coefficient 
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estimates on vacancy are much higher, which is reasonable since this measure has a lower 
average and varies less than delinquency. The coefficient estimates for ventilation and NICU 
admission are not significant for any trimester.  
While this proxy for foreclosure is not perfect, for the reasons described in the data 
section, it is reassuring that I estimate a negative effect on some infant health outcomes using a 
different independent variable collected in a different way by a different source. Additionally, 
the quarterly data allows one to see if the results are sensitive to the timing of the shock. Table 
2.7 shows that the results are robust across several specifications linking the vacancy data to 
different points in pregnancy. Breaking the results down by racial/ethnic subgroups, there is a 
generally large negative impact of delinquency on the health of Hispanic infants, for whom the 
coefficient for low 5-minute Apgar is also significant.
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VI. MECHANISMS 
Financial stress could impact infant health through several channels. Infant health may be 
affected by increases in maternal stress levels, which has been shown to increase the probability 
that an infant will be preterm and under weight for gestational age (Beydoun and Saftlas, 2008). 
Though, without any data on individual stress levels, there is no way to separate out this effect. 
Changes in infant health could also be driven by a selection effect if the foreclosure crisis 
impacted the decision to become pregnant differentially among women, based on observable 
characteristics. A financial shock may also impact access to health care and utilization of 
prenatal care, though it is unclear whether it would reduce access or increase it. The physical 
health of mothers could be also be impacted, leading to conditions like hypertension and diabetes 
(Currie and Tekin, 2015), which can complicate pregnancies. Finally, financial stress may impact 
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 Tables available upon request to jachett1@illinois.edu. 
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infant health by changing maternal behaviors such as cigarette consumption, though there is 
mixed evidence as to whether activities that are detrimental to health are procyclical or 
countercyclical. 
Below, I explore the different mechanisms through which financial stress may impact 
infant health. However, I am unable to identify a single underlying mechanism as there may be 
more than one impacting infant health.  
a) SELECTION 
In Tables 2.8 and 2.9, I consider whether high rates of mortgage delinquency affected 
fertility decisions. If the foreclosure crisis led to healthier or better educated women delaying or 
foregoing pregnancy, for example, the results would be biased upwards due to this selection 
effect. In order to test for this, I look at the total number of births at the county level, across 
racial/ethnic subgroups and across education levels, so the unit of observation is at the county-
year level. Again, I include county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the county level. In Table 2.8, I include results for all births, all births by 
racial/ethnic subgroup, and births across educational attainment subgroups. I do not find a 
statistically significant effect of mortgage delinquency on total births or on total births by 
racial/ethnic subgroups. However, unemployment has a large negative effect on total births by 
black mothers. These results are consistent if I control for mortgage delinquency or 
unemployment separately. Further splitting the subgroups by education level, I find that there are 
only statistically significant increases in births to black and Hispanic women with some college. 
It is not clear what effect an increase in births to women in these groups would have on my 
results.  
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In Table 2.9, I consider how mortgage delinquency affects fertility decisions by age 
groups. I find that there is a significant effect. Births to black and Hispanic mothers over 35 
years old significantly increase, while births to white mothers in the same age group significantly 
decrease. There is also an increase in births to black women aged 25 to 35. Given that infants 
born to older mothers have a higher risk of negative health outcomes, this selection effect may be 
driving the results.  
In Table 2.10, I include all available demographic controls, including indicators for 
maternal race/ethnic groups, age groups, and educational attainment. While I still estimate 
significant effects of mortgage delinquency on premature birth and gestation time, I lose 
significance across the other variables. However, not all birth certificates contain maternal 
education data and the sample contains roughly 10 million fewer observations than in Table 2.3. 
Collection of this data does not systematically differ at the state or even county level and it is 
unclear what potential sample differences exist between mothers who choose to give this 
information and those who choose not to. Table 2.11 contains results from running the basic 
analysis, without controls, but using the same sample as in Table 2.10. With demographic 
controls, there is still a large significant effect of mortgage delinquency on the number of 
premature infants and on gestation time more generally, further pointing to the robustness of 
these particular results. The results are very consistent across the two specifications, with 
unchanged levels of significance and nearly identical point estimates. This suggests that the loss 
of significance across the other variables may be due to differences in the sample as opposed to 
the inclusion of controls for demographic characteristics. Given these results, it is unlikely that 
selection effects are driving the primary results shown in Table 2.3.  
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b) CHANGES IN MEDICAL CARE 
Financial stress could also change the level of prenatal care received by women. It could 
increase if more women qualify for public coverage through Medicaid and the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Benefits vary by state, however, and there are likely to be 
gaps in coverage. It could also decrease if women are losing private insurance without going on 
public plans, receiving less care, or receiving less intensive care if they are on public plans.  
Looking at the top of Table 2.12, which contains the results for the whole sample, there is 
little effect of mortgage delinquency on prenatal care utilization, when demographic controls are 
omitted. If we include them, however, there are relatively large and significant coefficients for 
delinquency on the number of women foregoing all prenatal care and those who are receiving 
insufficient care, defined as fewer than 5 prenatal visits over the course of a pregnancy. These 
results suggest that a 10 percentage point increase in delinquency would increase the number of 
women foregoing prenatal care by more than 24%.  
Looking at the effect of mortgage delinquency on prenatal care usage across racial/ethnic 
subgroups, we see similar results for black mothers. While there are significant estimates for 
delinquency on foregoing prenatal care and on receiving insufficient prenatal care in 
specifications without demographic controls, these become very significant when these controls 
are included. The coefficients for late prenatal care, defined as beginning care in the third 
trimester, and negative coefficients for beginning care in the first trimester are significant for 
white mothers across both specifications as well. While the sample difference across the 
specifications with and without demographic controls may be important, there is evidence that 
mortgage delinquency reduces the use of prenatal care under either specification.   
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Running separate regressions for delinquency and unemployment, I find that the effects 
of delinquency are roughly similar and there are no significant estimates for unemployment 
when run separately, across any subgroups.  
 
c) MATERNAL HEALTH 
Since the foreclosure rate is known to impact adult health (Currie and Tekin 2015), then 
worsened maternal health could account for worsening infant health. In table 2.12, I look at the 
impact of the mortgage delinquency rate on various maternal health indicators that are also risk 
factors for birth. These include pre-pregnancy diabetes, hypertension (both pre-pregnancy and 
during pregnancy), and eclampsia, which is a serious complication that stems from high blood 
pressure and results in convulsions that may lead to coma. Currie and Tekin (2015) find that both 
the rates of diabetes and hypertension significantly increase for the age group most likely to 
become pregnant (20-49) as the foreclosure rate increases. However, I find no evidence of a 
negative impact on maternal health, regardless of whether or not demographic controls are 
included.  
d) MATERNAL BEHAVIOR 
While there is mixed evidence in the literature on how financial stress influences risky 
behaviors such as smoking and drinking, I find some evidence that mortgage delinquency 
increases daily cigarette consumption as shown in Tables 2.14 and 2.15. Without demographic 
controls, I find significant effects of mortgage delinquency on smoking throughout the 
pregnancy. However, for these regressions, inclusion of demographic controls alters the results 
substantially. With these controls, I find a positive significant effect on the number of cigarettes 
smoked per day in the third trimester for all mothers. I find weakly significant effects on the 
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number of cigarettes smoked per day in the first two trimesters. Mortgage delinquency does not 
increase the share of women who smoke at all during pregnancy, suggesting that it increases the 
intensity of cigarette consumption among women who are already smokers. Among all mothers 
and with controls included in the regression, a 10 percentage point increase in the delinquency 
rate would increase the number of cigarettes smoked per day by nearly 18% in the third 
trimester.  
In Table 2.15, I look at the impact of mortgage delinquency on maternal behaviors across 
racial/ethnic subgroups and find that these results are being driven by increases in smoking 
among white mothers. I find that I lose significance across all variables for black and Hispanic 
mothers when demographics are included. There is a significant effect on smoking in the first 
and third trimesters for white women and a weakly significant effect on smoking in the second 
trimester.  
 Maternal smoking during pregnancy has been associated with a number of negative infant 
health outcomes, primarily reduced birth weight, reduced birth length, and reduced head 
circumference (Abel, 1980; Vik et al., 1996; Agrawal et al., 2010; Shankaran et al., 2004; 
Gilman et al., 2008). Causation has been difficult to establish in this literature and one of the 
most credible attempts occurred in the 80s, when Sexton and Hebel randomly assigned mothers 
to receive smoking cessation aids and found that infants of mothers in that group had 
significantly higher birth weight.  
Interestingly, the timing of smoking and smoking cessation seems to matter 
tremendously. Lieberman et al. (1994) found that infants of women who quit smoking by the 
third trimester were not more likely to be small-for-gestational-age compared to nonsmokers, 
while women who began smoking in the second or third trimesters had infants with an elevated 
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risk of being underweight for their gestational age. Several studies have found that smoking in 
the third trimester most increases the risk of delivering infants with low birth weight and that the 
risk of being underweight increases with the number of cigarettes smoked per day (Bernstein et 
al., 2005; England et al., 2001; and Lieberman et al., 1994). Given this, the results regarding 
daily cigarette consumption are particularly worrying.  
Overall, considering the possible mechanisms that underlie the relationship between 
financial stress and infant health, I find that there is some evidence that suggests a shift in the age 
of mothers, with more women over 35 giving birth in times of high mortgage delinquency. 
However, even if all demographic controls are included in the regressions, I still find a 
significant effect of mortgage delinquency on premature births. I find strong evidence that high 
rates of mortgage delinquency reduce utilization of prenatal care and also increase smoking 
intensity during pregnancy. I find no evidence that high rates of mortgage delinquency reduced 
maternal health.   
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper is the first to analyze the effect of a plausibly exogenous negative financial 
shock, the foreclosure crisis, on infant health outcomes. I find that my measures of financial 
stress, the mortgage delinquency rate and the USPS collected vacancy rate, have a significant 
and large negative effect on infant health. The impact of financial stress on increasing the 
probability of being born prematurely is robust across many specifications. I also find evidence 
of an effect on birth weight and admissions to the NICU, among other indicators of poor health. 
The negative impact on health is largest for infants of black mothers, who may have been more 
negatively affected by the forces that led to the foreclosure crisis.  
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The primary mechanisms behind the relationship between the foreclosure crisis and 
worsened infant health outcomes are reduced utilization of prenatal care and increases in the 
intensity of smoking during the third trimester. Interestingly, these are the same mechanisms 
identified by Hoynes et al. (2015) that led to an improvement in infant health, given an increase 
in the EITC. Given that these effects were larger for white mothers, there may be other 
important, unobserved, mechanism that impact black mothers more, such as stress. 
While I do find negative and significant effects on infant health, it is likely that these 
effects are understated to the level of aggregation to the county level, which will bias the results 
towards zero. Currie and Tekin (2015) find that their results for the impact of foreclosure on 
adult health, while still significant at the county-level, are considerably smaller than their 
estimates at the zip code level. There is further work to be done analyzing the effect of the 
foreclosure crisis and negative wealth shocks in general at both smaller levels of aggregation, 
capturing more variation, and at the individual level.  
The analysis presented in this paper may also understate the total effect of foreclosure on 
infant health due to the omission of infant death data. Not only are infants who die after birth 
excluded entirely, but increases in smoking in particular leads to an increased chance of 
miscarriage (Abel, 1980). Given the multiple sources of downward bias, the persistent effect of 
financial stress on premature births is particularly compelling.  
My findings suggest that though there are government programs in existence to provide 
financially stressed expecting mothers with adequate prenatal care, such as Medicaid and S-
CHIP, there are still important gaps that lead to reduced prenatal care utilization and worsened 
infant health outcomes. Without improvements to these programs in terms of coverage, large 
financial shocks to the economy will continue to have a negative effect on infant health and there 
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is evidence that these effects may last well in to child hood (Vik et al., 1996; Agrawal et al., 
2010; Gilman et al., 2008), further disadvantaging these infants.  
The negative effect of the foreclosure crisis on infant health also represents another cost 
of such crises, which can be taken in to consideration when crafting policy and designing 
programs meant to provide financial relief to families.  
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IX. TABLES 
 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
  Mean SD N 
Mortgage delinquency  4.130 4.257 24,170,735 
Vacancy  1.103 .786 13,964,248 
Black 0.154 0.361 24,170,735 
White (non Hispanic) 0.506 0.500 24,170,735 
Hispanic 0.270 0.444 24,170,735 
Education    
     Less than high school 0.192 0.161 14,957,983 
     High school 0.264 0.094 14,957,983 
     Some college 0.246 0.083 14,957,983 
     4+ years college 0.300 0.201 14,957,983 
Less than 25 years old 0.293 0.455 24,170,735 
25-35 years old 0.522 0.500 24,170,735 
Greater than 35 years old 0.154 0.361 24,170,735 
Married 0.609 0.203 24,170,735 
% prenatal in 1st trimester 0.868 0.100 15,514,409 
% no prenatal 0.028 0.060 15,514,409 
% late prenatal 0.049 0.067 15,514,409 
% insufficient prenatal 0.050 0.047 24,169,909 
Smoked during pregnancy 0.076 0.069 13,510,874 
5 minute apgar  8.823 0.174 23,074,246 
% apgar = 6 or less 0.017 0.015 23,074,246 
Gestation (weeks) 38.535 0.351 24,170,735 
% premature (< 37 weeks) 0.127 0.037 24,170,735 
Birth weight (grams) 3259.0 109.6 24,170,699 
% very low birth weight (< 
1500g) 
0.016 0.012 24,170,699 
Any assisted ventilation 0.041 0.049 15,468,806 
Admission to NICU 0.074 0.036 15,468,806 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics by Race 
 
  Black 
 
White 
 
Hispanic 
  Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
 
Mean SD 
Education          
     Less than high school  0.212 0.074  0.085 0.053  0.421 0.113 
     High school  0.351 0.073  0.229 0.084  0.300 0.061 
     Some college  0.289 0.071  0.271 0.076  0.182 0.064 
     4+ years college  0.148 0.080  0.415 0.153  0.097 0.053 
Less than 25 years old  0.412 0.492  0.240 0.427  0.362 0.481 
25-35 years old  0.422 0.494  0.568 0.495  0.470 0.499 
Greater than 35 years old  0.112 0.315  0.177 0.381  0.120 0.325 
Married  0.293 0.106  0.743 0.096  0.485 0.087 
% prenatal in 1st trimester  0.797 0.101  0.908 0.069  0.831 0.112 
% no prenatal  0.047 0.076  0.021 0.053  0.030 0.060 
% late prenatal  0.081 0.080  0.034 0.058  0.059 0.069 
% insufficient prenatal  0.090 0.051  0.032 0.028  0.066 0.053 
Smoked during pregnancy  0.078 0.053  0.109 0.068  0.020 0.025 
5 minute apgar   8.722 0.196  8.829 0.167  8.862 0.156 
% apgar = 6 or less  0.029 0.019  0.016 0.013  0.013 0.011 
Gestation (weeks)  38.062 0.346  38.634 0.296  38.604 0.234 
% premature (< 37 weeks)  0.179 0.038  0.116 0.029  0.121 0.024 
Birth weight (grams)  3067.8 76.3  3317.8 66.0  3276.0 56.4 
% very low birth weight (< 
1500g) 
 0.033 0.014  0.014 0.009  0.013 0.006 
Any assisted ventilation  0.051 0.054  0.046 0.051  0.031 0.042 
Admission to NICU  0.099 0.040   0.076 0.035   0.062 0.030 
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Table 2.3: The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Infant Health 
 
  (1) (2)    (3)   (4)    (5)       (6)        (7) (8) 
Variables 5 min apgar 
low 5 min 
apgar premature gestation birth weight 
very low 
birth 
weight   ventilation NICU 
                  
delinquency -0.00264* 0.00020 0.00059** -0.00717*** -0.456* 0.00001 0.00126** 0.00069** 
 
(0.00150) (0.00014) (0.00023) (0.00197) (0.239) (0.00003) (0.00050) (0.00028) 
unemployment -0.00364 0.00006 -0.00032 -0.00025 -0.527 0.00012 0.00018 -0.00045 
 
(0.00314) (0.00027) (0.00037) (0.00370) (0.536) (0.00007) (0.00133) (0.00080) 
% effect 0.03 1.11 0.46 0.02 0.01 0.06 3.07 0.93 
         Observations 23,074,294 23,074,294 24,170,735 24,170,735 24,170,973 24,170,973 15,469,040 15,469,040 
R-squared 0.726 0.557 0.524 0.570 0.383 0.466 0.729 0.682 
          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
county level. % effect refers to the percentage change in the outcome variable given a 1 percentage point increase in delinquency.  
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Infant Health 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 5 min apgar 
low 5 min 
apgar premature gestation birth weight 
very low 
birth 
weight ventilation NICU 
                  
delinquency -0.00305** 0.00020 0.00056** -0.00723*** -0.52800** 0.00003 0.00128** 0.00064** 
 
(0.00152) (0.00014) (0.00022) (0.00191) (0.23900) (0.00003) (0.00051) (0.00027) 
% effect 0.03 1.19 0.44 0.02 0.02 0.16 3.12 0.86 
         Observations 23,115,165 23,115,165 24,211,606 24,211,606 24,211,851 24,211,851 15,469,040 15,469,040 
R-squared 0.725 0.557 0.523 0.569 0.383 0.466 0.729 0.682 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. % effect refers to the percentage change in the outcome variable 
given a 1 percentage point increase in delinquency.  
 
 
Table 2.5 The Effect of Unemployment on Infant Health 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
5 min 
apgar 
low 5 min 
apgar premature gestation 
birth 
weight 
very low 
birth 
weight ventilation NICU 
                  
unemployment -0.00559* 0.00021 0.00020 -0.00657* -0.92900* 0.00013* 0.00139 0.00023 
 
(0.00339) (0.00029) (0.00035) (0.00380) (0.54300) (0.00007) (0.00136) (0.00082) 
% effect 0.063 1.22 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.81 3.38 0.31 
         Observations 23,074,294 23,074,294 24,170,735 24,170,735 24,170,973 24,170,973 15,469,040 15,469,040 
R-squared 0.725 0.557 0.524 0.569 0.383 0.466 0.728 0.682 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. % effect refers to the percentage change in the outcome 
variable given a 1 percentage point increase in delinquency.  
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Table 2.6: The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Infant Health by Racial/Ethnic Subgroups 
           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 5 min apgar 
low 5 min 
apgar premature gestation birth weight 
very low 
birth weight ventilation NICU 
Black                 
delinquency -0.00686** 0.00062** 0.00063* -0.00754*** -1.215*** 0.00017** 0.00110 0.00127*** 
 
(0.00276) (0.00027) (0.00033) (0.00250) (0.401) (0.00008) (0.00067) (0.00042) 
unemployment -0.00802 0.00050 -0.00001 0.00543 -1.265 0.00014 0.00135 0.00154 
 
(0.00660) (0.00057) (0.00075) (0.00701) (1.062) (0.00023) (0.00208) (0.00184) 
% effect 0.08 2.11 0.35 0.02 0.04 0.52 2.17 1.28 
         Observations 3,658,719 3,658,719 3,722,299 3,722,299 3,722,332 3,722,332 2,236,888 2,236,888 
R-squared 0.756 0.660 0.697 0.735 0.807 0.643 0.825 0.718 
White         
delinquency -0.00177 0.00013 0.00043** -0.0048** -0.533* 0.00000 0.00137** 0.000659** 
 
(0.00159) (0.00014) (0.00022) (0.00212) (0.314) (0.00003) (0.00056) (0.00032) 
unemployment -0.00311 0.00002 -0.00010 -0.00465 -0.280 0.000168* -0.00031 -0.00067 
 
(0.00349) (0.00029) (0.00039) (0.00376) (0.616) (0.00009) (0.00121) (0.00063) 
% effect -0.02 0.81 0.37 0.01 0.02 0.01 3.00 0.87 
         Observations 11,905,485 11,905,485 12,225,432 12,225,432 12,225,619 12,225,619 7,580,199 7,580,199 
R-squared 0.785 0.678 0.800 0.838 0.873 0.735 0.837 0.854 
Hispanic 
        delinquency -0.00131 -0.00005 0.000914*** -0.00569** 0.102 -0.00004 0.00116** 0.000528* 
 
(0.00127) (0.00015) (0.00027) (0.00240) (0.359) (0.00005) (0.00058) (0.00031) 
unemployment -0.00250 -0.00015 -0.00037 0.00096 -1.112 0.00012 0.00059 -0.00103 
 
(0.00325) (0.00034) (0.00052) (0.00536) (0.898) (0.00010) (0.00223) (0.00119) 
% effect 0.01 0.40 0.75 0.01 0.00 -0.34 3.73 0.85 
         Observations 5,886,232 5,886,232 6,458,502 6,458,502 6,458,503 6,458,503 4,577,822 4,577,822 
R-squared 0.809 0.668 0.71 0.79 0.881 0.645 0.795 0.776 
           
 66 
 
Table 2.7: The Effect of Vacancy on Infant Health 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Variables 5 min apgar 
low 5 min 
apgar premature gestation birth weight 
very low birth 
weight ventilation NICU 
Quarter:                   
Conception 
vacancy  0.00252 -0.00088 0.00215*** -0.0245*** -2.877*** 0.00032* -0.00271 -0.00258* 
 
(0.00744) (0.00061) (0.00072) (0.00676) (1.075) (0.00019) (0.00193) (0.00148) 
unemployment -0.00352 0.00016 0.00026 -0.00567 -0.522 0.00002 0.00092 -0.00020 
 
(0.00276) (0.00028) (0.00044) (0.00399) (0.570) (0.00009) (0.00105) (0.00068) 
 
% effect 0.03 5.18 1.69 0.06 0.09 2.00 6.61 3.49 
 
Observations 13,828,232 13,828,232 13,964,248 13,964,248 13,964,199 13,964,199 9,550,511 9,550,511 
 
R-squared 0.557 0.277 0.113 0.114 0.201 0.082 0.695 0.375 
First 
trimester 
vacancy  0.00227 -0.00093 0.00281*** -0.0275*** -2.625** 0.00038* -0.00162 -0.00084 
 
(0.00672) (0.00057) (0.00081) (0.00733) (1.144) (0.00022) (0.00201) (0.00134) 
unemployment -0.00372 0.00015 0.00023 -0.00511 -0.454 0.00009 0.00096 0.00009 
 
(0.00275) (0.00029) (0.00044) (0.00398) (0.609) (0.00009) (0.00086) (0.00073) 
 
% effect 0.03 5.44 2.21 0.07 0.08 2.38 3.95 1.14 
 
Observations 13,001,259 13,001,259 13,137,270 13,137,270 13,137,214 13,137,214 8,882,531 8,882,531 
 
R-squared 0.546 0.268 0.108 0.109 0.196 0.079 0.695 0.36 
Second 
trimester 
vacancy  -0.00068 -0.00068 0.00300*** -0.0211*** -3.068** 0.00025 -0.00184 -0.00078 
 
(0.00625) (0.00056) (0.00090) (0.00751) (1.284) (0.00025) (0.00196) (0.00160) 
unemployment -0.00285 0.00009 0.00005 -0.00384 -0.323 0.00009 0.00107 0.00054 
 
(0.00251) (0.00024) (0.00041) (0.00400) (0.608) (0.00010) (0.00083) (0.00072) 
 
% effect 0.01 3.98 2.36 0.05 0.09 1.55 4.49 1.05 
 
Observations 12,216,637 12,216,637 12,352,636 12,352,636 12,352,603 12,352,603 8,263,337 8,263,337 
 
R-squared 0.558 0.277 0.105 0.107 0.194 0.08 0.696 0.349 
Third 
trimester 
vacancy  0.00202 -0.00040 0.00315** -0.0187* -3.777** 0.00023 -0.00227 -0.00023 
 
(0.00747) (0.00063) (0.00122) (0.01030) (1.730) (0.00031) (0.00273) (0.00176) 
unemployment -0.00321 0.00022 0.00012 -0.00331 -0.044 0.00014 0.00144* 0.00033 
 
(0.00248) (0.00024) (0.00044) (0.00431) (0.607) (0.00010) (0.00084) (0.00067) 
 
% effect 0.02 2.38 2.48 0.05 0.12 1.41 5.54 0.31 
 
Observations 11,444,565 11,444,565 11,580,555 11,580,555 11,580,525 11,580,525 7,664,136 7,664,136 
 
R-squared 0.569 0.287 0.121 0.119 0.21 0.09 0.71 0.386 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
county level. % effect refers to the percentage change in the outcome variable given a 1 percentage point increase in delinquency.  
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Table 2.8: The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Total Births by Education 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
total births by maternal education level 
VARIABLES total births 
 less than 
high school 
high school some college 
4+ years 
college 
All         
 
delinquency 2.880 9.622 1.704 45.47** -28.89 
 
(17.59) (29.16) (35.81) (19.76) (27.52) 
unemployment -100.5 -3.266 2.516 -11.73 4.107 
 
(64.70) (21.57) (24.21) (22.96) (27.49) 
Observations 4,125 2,956 2,961 2,968 2,965 
R-squared 0.942 0.916 0.911 0.903 0.907 
Black 
     
delinquency 4.952 -0.713 -8.836 12.35*** -0.645 
 
(4.556) (7.061) (11.38) (4.773) (3.437) 
unemployment -44.86*** -4.314 1.407 -4.334 1.533 
 
(13.38) (4.691) (6.872) (4.903) (3.096) 
Observations 4,101 2,827 2,884 2,878 2,755 
R-squared 0.940 0.894 0.894 0.903 0.902 
White 
     
delinquency -6.984 -1.824 -12.96 3.114 -26.01 
 
(7.842) (2.760) (9.097) (6.889) (16.02) 
unemployment -10.26 -0.225 4.748 2.863 13.06 
 
(21.63) (2.401) (6.511) (8.879) (17.24) 
Observations 4,125 2,954 2,957 2,966 2,965 
R-squared 0.944 0.913 0.910 0.917 0.907 
Hispanic 
     
delinquency -2.100 6.491 21.15 28.50*** 5.956 
 
(10.79) (21.33) (16.59) (9.887) (5.470) 
unemployment -36.01 1.966 -6.974 -11.41 -2.029 
 
(34.46) (18.09) (14.55) (10.88) (4.721) 
Observations 4,103 2,918 2,931 2,910 2,853 
R-squared 0.941 0.921 0.917 0.892 0.914 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county fixed effects and state by year 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.  
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Table 2.9: The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on 
Total Births by Age 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables 
age < 25 
years age 25 - 35 
age > 35 
years 
All       
delinquency -9.116 10.59 6.094 
 
(7.292) (9.162) (3.896) 
unemployment -31.59 -54.54* -10.68 
 
(21.67) (31.85) (10.47) 
Observations 4,118 4,125 4,119 
R-squared 0.936 0.944 0.944 
Black 
   delinquency 0.662 4.529** 1.573** 
 
(2.083) (2.232) (0.707) 
unemployment -17.20*** -20.39*** -5.777*** 
 
(5.537) (5.856) (1.704) 
Observations 4,064 4,071 3,846 
R-squared 0.938 0.942 0.943 
White 
   delinquency -1.661 -0.959 -4.068* 
 
(2.152) (4.519) (2.410) 
unemployment -6.522 -11.74 8.607 
 
(5.802) (11.99) (5.378) 
Observations 4,114 4,124 4,117 
R-squared 0.940 0.946 0.940 
Hispanic 
   delinquency -8.714* 2.089 6.585*** 
 
(4.862) (5.232) (1.580) 
unemployment -6.219 -18.17 -9.515** 
 
(13.69) (15.73) (3.739) 
Observations 4,092 4,093 3,991 
R-squared 0.937 0.942 0.946 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include 
county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered at the county level.  
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Table 2.10 The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Infant Health with Controls 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (10) 
Variables 5 min apgar low 5 min apgar premature gestation 
birth 
weight 
very low birth 
weight ventilation NICU 
                  
delinquency -0.00285 0.00025 0.00064*** -0.00895*** -0.06820 -0.00005 0.00103 -0.00070 
 
(0.00300) (0.00024) (0.00018) (0.00237) (0.35800) (0.00005) (0.00087) (0.00061) 
unemployment -0.00294 -0.00016 -0.00046 0.00209 -0.29400 0.00009 0.00027 0.00145* 
 
(0.00509) (0.00041) (0.00047) (0.00484) (0.69900) (0.00010) (0.00155) (0.00080) 
demographic 
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
% effect 0.03 1.46 0.50 0.02  0.00 0.31 2.51 0.94 
         Observations 13,995,132 13,995,132 14,520,478 14,520,478 14,520,542 14,520,542 7,777,631 7,777,631 
R-squared 0.495 0.214 0.298 0.376 0.537 0.185 0.529 0.346 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the 
county level. Demographic controls include indicator variables for race/ethnic groups, age groups, and maternal education level. % effect refers to 
the percentage change in the outcome variable given a 1 percentage point increase in delinquency.  
 
Table 2.11: The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Infant Health without Controls 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (10) 
Variables 5 min apgar low 5 min apgar premature gestation birth weight 
very low birth 
weight ventilation NICU 
                  
delinquency -0.00291 0.00026 0.00067*** -0.00935*** -0.33500 -0.00004 -0.00007 -0.00070 
 
(0.00303) (0.00025) (0.00018) (0.00234) (0.36400) (0.00005) (0.00010) (0.00061) 
unemployment -0.00307 -0.00015 -0.00040 0.00173 -0.40600 0.00012 -0.00002 0.00147* 
 
(0.00510) (0.00041) (0.00046) (0.00486) (0.72500) (0.00011) (0.00022) (0.00080) 
demographic 
controls no no no no no no no no 
Observations 13,995,132 13,995,132 14,520,478 14,520,478 14,520,542 14,520,542 7,777,631 7,777,631 
R-squared 0.458 0.176 0.160 0.215 0.191 0.111 0.248 0.289 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county 
level. % effect refers to the percentage change in the outcome variable given a 1 percentage point increase in delinquency.  
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Table 2.12: The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Prenatal Care 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
prenatal care in 1st 
trimester late prenatal no prenatal insufficient prenatal 
All 
        delinquency -0.00148 -0.00135 0.00268* 0.00267* 0.00019 0.00068*** 0.00020 0.00080** 
 
(0.00203) (0.00205) (0.00153) (0.00155) (0.00016) (0.00024) (0.00027) (0.00039) 
unemployment 0.00639 0.00802** -0.00264 -0.00414 -0.00085 -0.00137* -0.00127 -0.00207** 
 
(0.00389) (0.00379) (0.00320) (0.00323) (0.00067) (0.00083) (0.00083) (0.00095) 
demographic 
controls 
no yes no yes no yes no yes 
% effect 0.17 0.16 5.50 5.48 0.70 2.44 0.43 1.59 
Observations 15,514,544 14,520,081 15,514,544 14,520,081 
24,155,57
0 14,515,588 24,169,986 14,515,588 
R-squared 0.527 0.579 0.615 0.523 0.277 0.368 0.536 0.471 
Black 
        delinquency -0.00240 -0.00236 0.00196 0.00202 0.00039** 0.00071** 0.00103* 0.00215*** 
 
(0.00427) (0.00446) (0.00309) (0.00320) (0.00019) (0.00029) (0.00056) (0.00082) 
unemployment 0.00784 0.00854 -0.00613 -0.00695 -0.00173 -0.00249* -0.00163 -0.00339** 
 
(0.00882) (0.00907) (0.00720) (0.00740) (0.00116) (0.00146) (0.00153) (0.00171) 
demographic 
controls 
no yes no yes no yes no yes 
% effect 0.30 0.30 2.42 4.25 0.48 0.88 1.20 2.39 
Observations 2,432,921 2,326,154 2,432,921 2,326,154 3,719,481 2,325,086 3,721,938 2,325,086 
R-squared 0.732 0.556 0.707 0.542 0.298 0.391 0.793 0.474 
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Table 2.12 (cont.): The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Prenatal Care 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
prenatal care in 1st 
trimester late prenatal no prenatal insufficient prenatal 
White 
        delinquency -0.00354** -0.00332* 0.00369*** 0.00352** 0.00013 0.00032** 0.00013 0.00040 
 
(0.00177) (0.00178) (0.00138) (0.00139) (0.00010) (0.00014) (0.00022) (0.00033) 
unemployment 0.00663** 0.00812** -0.00168 -0.00360 -0.00043 -0.00043 -0.000948* -0.00094 
 
(0.00332) (0.00315) (0.00279) (0.00257) (0.00041) (0.00043) (0.00055) (0.00070) 
demographic 
controls 
no yes no yes no yes no yes 
% effect 0.39 0.37 17.27 16.47 0.38 0.93 0.44 1.26 
Observations 7,838,677 7,500,603 7,838,677 7,500,603 12,220,016 7,498,436 12,225,228 7,498,436 
R-squared 0.646 0.56 0.631 0.531 0.203 0.325 0.694 0.45 
Hispanic 
        delinquency -0.00075 -0.00111 0.00167 0.00182 0.00030 0.00106* 0.00021 0.00065 
 
(0.00262) (0.00246) (0.00165) (0.00161) (0.00039) (0.00056) (0.00049) (0.00061) 
unemployment 0.00093 0.00407 -0.00115 -0.00288 -0.00120 -0.00274 -0.00182 -0.00336 
 
(0.00500) (0.00475) (0.00350) (0.00366) (0.00170) (0.00247) (0.00193) (0.00242) 
demographic 
controls 
no yes no yes no yes no yes 
% effect 0.09 0.13 5.59 6.09 0.51 1.81 0.35 0.99 
Observations 4,048,091 3,681,187 4,048,091 3,681,187 6,458,161 3,679,767 6,458,504 3,679,767 
R-squared 0.834 0.660 0.766 0.578 0.495 0.518 0.810 0.539 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. % effect refers to the percentage change in the outcome 
variable given a 1 percentage point increase in delinquency.  
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  Table 2.13: The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Maternal Health 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables pre-pregnancy diabetes 
pre-pregnancy 
hypertension gestational hypertension eclampsia 
delinquency -0.00003 0.00024 0.00004 0.00012 0.00008 0.00025 0.00004 0.00007 
 
(0.00025) (0.00052) (0.00021) (0.00015) (0.00008) (0.00024) (0.00004) (0.00009) 
unemployment -0.00006 -0.00060 -0.00043 -0.00021 -0.00013 -0.00069 -0.00020** -0.00034** 
 
(0.00054) (0.00074) (0.00040) (0.00021) (0.00016) (0.00050) (0.00009) (0.00015) 
demographic 
controls 
no yes no yes no yes no yes 
Observations 24,170,886 14,520,339 24,170,886 14,520,339 24,170,886 14,520,339 24,170,886 14,520,339 
R-squared 0.495 0.349 0.644 0.199 0.473 0.232 0.618 0.162 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the county level. Demographic controls include indicator variables for race/ethnic groups, age groups, and maternal 
education level. % effect refers to the percentage change in the outcome variable given a 1 percentage point increase in 
delinquency.  
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Table 2.14: The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Maternal Behavior  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Variables weight gain 
cigartettes/day 1st 
trimester 
cigartettes/day 2nd 
trimester 
cigartettes/day 3rd 
trimester any tobacco use  
All                   
 delinquency 0.00133* 0.00208 0.0169*** 0.0106* 0.0161*** 0.00994* 0.0162*** 0.0101** 0.00043 0.00017 
 
(0.00074) (0.00154) (0.00503) (0.00607) (0.00364) (0.00551) (0.00340) (0.00511) (0.00041) (0.00043) 
unemp. -0.00093 -0.00222 -0.01380 -0.0217*** -0.0164** -0.0171*** -0.0168** -0.0136*** 0.00009 -0.00022 
 
(0.00184) (0.00241) (0.00945) (0.00735) (0.00707) (0.00565) (0.00661) (0.00511) (0.00071) (0.00063) 
demographic 
controls no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
% effect 0.40 0.63 2.02 1.25 2.58 1.58 2.89 1.79 0.57 0.21 
Observations 24,171,200 
14,520,60
1 12,809,631 6,888,912 
12,809,63
3 6,888,887 
12,809,63
3 6,888,884 
13,510,97
3 
13,106,43
0 
R-squared 0.824 0.767 0.765 0.489 0.756 0.458 0.744 0.444 0.744 0.556 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 All regressions include county fixed effects and state by year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. 
Demographic controls include indicator variables for race/ethnic groups, age groups, and maternal education level. % effect refers to the percentage change 
in the outcome variable given a 1 percentage point increase in delinquency.  
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Table 2.15: The Effect of Mortgage Delinquency on Maternal Behavior by Racial/Ethnic Subgroups 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
variables weight gain 
cigartettes/day 1st 
trimester 
cigartettes/day 2nd 
trimester cigartettes/day 3rd trimester any tobacco use  
Black 
          delinquency 0.00189* 0.00335 0.0203* -0.00189 0.0141** 0.00067 0.0142*** -0.00104 0.00112 0.00090 
 
(0.00110) (0.00250) (0.01160) (0.01430) (0.00588) (0.00782) (0.00540) (0.00748) (0.00113) (0.00111) 
unemp -0.00070 -0.00165 0.02590 -0.01420 0.01060 -0.01110 0.01150 -0.01190 0.00229 0.00230 
 
(0.00203) (0.00304) (0.02470) (0.01450) (0.01590) (0.01160) (0.01540) (0.01050) (0.00184) (0.00172) 
demographic 
controls 
no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
% effect 0.59 1.05 2.87 0.25 2.70 0.12 2.99 0.21 1.43 1.14 
Observations 3,722,411 2,326,452 1,700,484 950,563 1,700,484 950,541 1,700,484 950,538 2,136,441 2,068,351 
R-squared 0.837 0.55 0.775 0.353 0.755 0.331 0.725 0.31 0.878 0.476 
White 
          delinquency 0.00076 0.00153 0.0164** 0.0215** 0.0180*** 0.0183* 0.0183*** 0.0194** 0.00053 0.00047 
 
(0.00078) (0.00146) (0.00707) (0.01010) (0.00538) (0.00952) (0.00492) (0.00860) (0.00046) (0.00039) 
unemp -0.00220 -0.00469** -0.0316*** -0.0431*** -0.0291*** -0.0311*** -0.0298*** -0.0245*** -0.00072 -0.00101 
 
(0.00152) (0.00209) (0.01210) (0.01080) (0.00941) (0.00839) (0.00899) (0.00799) (0.00087) (0.00070) 
demographic 
controls 
no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
% effect 0.22 0.45 1.19 1.55 1.75 1.76 1.97 1.47 0.49 0.43 
Observations 12,225,741 7,500,894 6,372,299 3,413,792 6,372,299 3,413,793 6,372,299 3,413,790 7,050,586 6,889,930 
R-squared 0.854 0.739 0.933 0.657 0.927 0.628 0.913 0.609 0.949 0.749 
Hispanic 
          delinquency 0.00202** 0.00261 0.00489** -0.00081 0.00422** 0.00075 0.00409** 0.00103 0.00011 0.00006 
 
(0.00094) -0.00167 (0.00246) -0.00257 (0.00167) -0.00196 (0.00169) -0.00194 (0.00015) -0.000147 
unemp 0.00114 0.00236 0.00442 0.00607 -0.00186 0.00137 -0.00133 0.00137 0.00001 -0.00001 
 
(0.00336) -0.0042 (0.00607) -0.00378 (0.00424) -0.00319 (0.00365) -0.00267 (0.00040) -0.000375 
demographic 
controls 
no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes 
% effect 0.63 0.82 3.25 0.54 4.21 0.75 4.72 1.19 0.56 0.28 
Observations 6,458,504 3,681,316 3,815,508 2,032,185 3,815,508 2,032,185 3,815,508 2,032,185 3,301,415 3,233,664 
R-squared 0.878 0.876 0.831 0.244 0.811 0.201 0.74 0.182 0.897 0.34 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE EFFECT OF TORT REFORM ON PATIENT SAFETY 
with Sarah Miller
16
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Proponents of tort reform extol its ability to reduce medical costs, both by lowering 
malpractice premiums and by discouraging physicians from providing inefficient, excessive care 
in order to reduce the probability of a lawsuit. Indeed, recent studies confirm that laws limiting 
physician liability are associated with reductions in both insurance premiums (Avraham, Dafny, 
and Schanzenbach 2013) and health care prices (Friedson 2012). However, by lowering the cost 
of medical errors, tort reform may create moral hazard, leading physicians and hospitals to 
provide less or lower-quality care. In this paper, we examine how tort reform affects a large class 
of medical errors: preventable patient safety events that occur during hospitalization. 
In a famous report by the Institute of Medicine (2000), it was estimated that between 
44,000 and 98,000 people die each year as a result of preventable medical errors in hospitals. Less 
extreme preventable adverse events, such as hospital-acquired infections and accidental 
punctures, are even more common. For example, Landrigan et al (2010) found that roughly 15% 
of admissions from a random sample of North Carolina hospital patients suffered from a 
preventable medical error.  
Preventing adverse medical events, in addition to improving the health outcomes of 
patients, is also a potentially important source of savings in the medical system. For example, 
Anderson et. al. (2007) find that hospital-acquired infections increase hospital costs by over 
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$10,000 per surgical-site infection and over $25,000 per incidence of ventilator-associated 
pneumonia. The authors estimate that the savings from preventing these infections could be over 
$500,000 per hospital per year. Similarly, avoidable pressure ulcers are estimated to cost over 
$40,000 per occurrence (Zaratkiewicz et. al. 2010). A more extreme medical error, wrong-site 
surgery, occurs approximately once per 100,000 surgeries, but often result in the death of the 
patient (Kwaan 2006). Because of the high costs of adverse events, reducing the incidence of 
preventable hospital events is an active goal for both health policymakers and private insurance 
companies: for example, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services announced in 2007 that 
Medicare would no longer reimburse hospitals for adverse medical events, and several private 
insurers have followed suit.   
There are few studies that address whether tort reform has an impact on patient safety and 
these are limited to a specific procedure. Kessler and McClellan (1996, 2002) find that tort 
reforms have no significant effect on health outcomes for elderly heart patients, but significantly 
reduce costs. Examining births in the US, Currie and MacLeod (2008) find that caps on 
noneconomic damages increase the usage of Cesarean sections and increases complications of 
labor and delivery, whereas reform of joint and several liability (JSL) decreases both. Iizuka 
(2011) finds a similar result for JSL reform, looking at complications related to four specific 
obstetrics/gynecology procedures. He finds no significant effect for caps on noneconomic 
damages, but caps on punitive damages and collateral source reform increase complications.  
Our study is the first to examine the effect of tort reform on a wide variety of patient 
safety outcomes. Using the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS), a nationally representative, 
stratified sample of 20 percent of US community hospitals, we estimate the effect of the adoption 
and removal of tort reform legislation on patient safety. Our sample covers the years 1993-2008 
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and includes 8 changes to tort law in 5 states. We find that caps on noneconomic damages 
significantly increase the number of patient safety events by between 4 and 5 percent. This 
increase is mostly due to an increase in hospital acquired infections and an increase in adverse 
events during post-operative care. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that a national tort 
reform law would result in approximately $680 million per year in additional hospital charges due 
to the increase in adverse events. Furthermore, we find no evidence that tort reform affects the 
observed riskiness of patients admitted to the hospital, suggesting that changes in the quality of 
hospital care are not driven by selection. Overall, our results indicate that although tort reform 
may lower medical expenses, it does so at a cost to the quality of care that patients receive. 
II. BACKGROUND ON TORTS 
The tort system is intended to compensate individuals for wrongs they have suffered. In 
the medical profession, tort law is frequently applied to instances where the patient experiences 
injury or death due to the professional negligence of a health care provider. While the goal of tort 
law is to protect consumers and to provide compensatory damages to patients that have suffered 
from a medical error, the link between tort law and patient safety is not well established.   
Recently, several states have adopted reforms to the tort system that limit the total amount 
of damages a patient can receive as a result of a lawsuit. Often, the justification for these reforms 
is that they will save money directly related to malpractice lawsuits and prevent the indirect costs 
of “defensive” medicine, which is the administration of more tests and procedures than is efficient 
in order to reduce the probability of a lawsuit.  
In achieving these goals, tort reform seems to have been successful. Arvaham (2007) finds 
in his examination of medical malpractice settlements that tort reforms decrease the number of 
claims by 5-13% and total annual payouts by more than 15%. Kessler and McClellen (1996) find 
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that reforms which directly limit awards reduce medical costs by 5-9%, using a panel of state 
reforms and data on all elderly Medicare beneficiaries treated for serious heart disease in the years 
1984, 1987, and 1990. They extend this work using more recent data for the same population and 
obtain similar estimates (Kessler and McClellen 2002). The authors find that tort reform primarily 
reduces costs through reducing diagnostic expenditures, suggesting the practice of defensive 
medicine. Additionally, Avraham, Dafny, and Schanzenbach (2013) find that tort reform lowers 
insurance premiums, and Friedson (2012) finds that tort reform lowers the prices paid by insurers 
for medical services. 
The most common reform is caps on noneconomic damages, which limits awards given to 
the plaintiff for pain and suffering. However, there are several other reforms that change rules 
governing whether or not awards can be offset by insurance payments, whom can be held 
accountable for negligence, caps on punitive awards, and evidence requirements.  A description 
of the seven most common reforms can be found in Table 3.1.  
Reforms are implemented at the state level, but because limiting awards given by juries is 
legally controversial, some state courts have struck down the laws. Illinois, a particularly colorful 
example, has passed caps on noneconomic damages twice in the time frame we consider, and both 
times the reforms were struck down. Table 3.2 lists the changes in tort law that have taken place 
between 1993 and 2008 by states available in our data and whether the law was passed or struck 
down. This feature of tort reforms, that they turn “on” and “off” over time, provides us with 
useful variation that we use to assess the impact of tort reform on patient safety events. The most 
common type of reform in our data is a cap on non-economic damages: our data covers 8 changes 
in caps in economic damages (5 adoptions and 3 strike-downs). In our analysis, we focus on caps 
on non-economic damages reform because it has the most variation over the time period in our 
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sample; however, we also present alternative models exploring the effects of other types of tort 
reforms.  
One of the ways in which medical malpractrice lawsuits are thought to lead to increased 
medical costs and defensive medicine is through an increase in medical malpractice premiums, 
though Currie and Macleod (2008) note that it is unclear that doctors would adjust their effort 
level or choice of procedures since malpractice premiums are set at the specialty-area level and 
are not experience rated. Additionally, doctors face little financial risk as claims rarely exceed the 
amount for which they are insured (Hyman and Silver 2013) and increased costs can be passed on 
to patients in the form of higher prices (Danzon, Pauly, and Kington 1990).  
However, there are many non-insurable costs associated with medical malpractice 
litigation to which doctors may be more sensitive. Lawsuits can be very costly in terms of time: 
the median amount of physician work time lost due to being sued is in the range of 3-5 days and 
the total value of lost work days was $140-$260 million in 2008 (Mello et al. 2010). Kessler and 
McClellen (2002) find that policies which reduce the time spent and the amount of conflict 
involved in defending against a claim can reduce the practice of defensive medicine.  
Additionally, doctors may be concerned about their reputations and any malpractice payment 
made on behalf of a physician must be registered in the National Practitioners’ Data Bank 
(NPDB), which can be searched by other medical professionals as well as potential employers.  
Ultimately, tort law seeks to balance the competing incentives of over- and under-use of 
medical care. While tort reforms that decrease physician or hospital liability may lead to less 
defensive medicine, they may also create moral hazard by reducing the consequences of 
providing low-quality care. In the next section, we present a simple model that describes how tort 
reform may affect provider behavior.  
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III. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
Tort reform lowers the cost of medical errors to physicians and hospitals. This may 
improve welfare if hospitals engage in costly and ineffective defensive medicine that raises health 
costs. However, it may reduce welfare if physicians and hospitals create negative externalities for 
their patients in the form of a higher medical error rate because they are no longer responsible for 
bearing the full cost of their actions. In this section, we present a simple model of physician 
behavior that describes how tort reform trades off between moral hazard and defensive medicine. 
Consider a health care provider who makes decisions on behalf of her patients about 
whether or not to receive some surgery. Patients vary in riskiness across some dimension λ. When 
a patient receives a surgery, the physician is paid the market price p. However, there is some risk 
that the patient will experience an adverse hospital event that will result in a law suit and cost the 
provider c. The costs may be monetary (in the form of direct payments or higher malpractice 
premiums), or they may be costs to the reputation of the provider and lost time. The probability of 
this adverse event increases in the riskiness of the patient, but it also decreases in the extra care 
put forth by the physician, ε, which costs b. This extra care may take the form of more tests or 
additional medical services that lower the probability of an adverse event. 
The provider makes a choice along two margins. First, she decides whether or not a 
patient should receive care based on how risky that patient is. She chooses a maximum riskiness 
for the marginal patient, λ-bar, and performs surgery on all patients with λ below this threshold. 
Second, she decides how much effort to put into the patient’s care. To that end, she maximizes: 
P* λ-bar – c*∫0
λ-bar
 r(ε, λ) dλ – b* ε        (1) 
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By choosing λ-bar and ε, where dr/dε < 0 and dr/d λ-bar > 0. Her optimal behavior dictates 
that she will increase patient riskiness until the marginal payoff (p) is equal to the marginal cost 
(c*r(ε, λ-bar)), and she will increase effort until the marginal payoff of effort (c*dr/dε) is equal to 
the marginal cost of effort (b). If tort reform decreases c, it will change both the riskiness of the 
marginal patient and the amount of extra care put forth by the physician. On the margin, the 
physician will perform surgery on riskier patients, and also put forth less extra care in total. As a 
consequence, the probability of an adverse event, r(ε, λ), will increase.  
Tort reform may be either welfare improving or welfare reducing. Assume the cost of an 
adverse event to a patient is A and the benefit of the surgery to the marginal patient is the price, p. 
The socially optimal tort law would set c=A, resulting in the preferred (possibly non-zero) risk of 
adverse events. When c>A, the physician is too cautious and engages in socially wasteful extra 
care, commonly called defensive medicine. When c<A, the physician engages in too little extra 
care, resulting in moral hazard. Notably, tort reform may increase the risk of adverse patient 
health events but still be welfare enhancing. 
IV. DATA DESCRIPTION AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
To evaluate the role of malpractice lawsuit exposure on patient outcomes, we use hospital 
discharge data from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS). This database, compiled and 
maintained by the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), contains patient-level 
observations from the administrative data of approximately 20 percent of all community hospitals 
in the United States. Our sample period extends from 1993 to 2008, totaling over 75 million 
hospitalizations and covering Y major state-level tort reforms. For each hospital discharge, we 
observe diagnoses, procedures, payer information, and patient demographic characteristics such 
as gender, race, and age.  States that participate in the NIS provide HCUP with discharge data on 
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a census of all hospitalizations occurring in their state during the year. Not all states provide data 
to the NIS for every year. In 1993, only 17 states participated. By 2008, this number had 
increased to 42 states. Table 3.3 lists state participation by year. The NIS samples hospitals within 
participating states and provides all discharges for selected hospitals. Because the availability of 
data for some states varies over time, we include state fixed effects in all of our models. 
We use measures created by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to 
identify adverse patient safety. These patient safety indicators were developed by AHRQ in 
conjunction with clinicians and researchers in the medical field and are intended to detect 
preventable medical errors that negatively affect patient health. The patient safety events 
identified by the AHRQ software are listed with a description in Table 3.4. The events indicated 
include, for example, infections due to medical care, negative post-operative events such as 
wound dehiscence, pulmonary embolism, or hip fracture, and physician errors such as accidental 
puncture or laceration. The AHRQ software excludes patients that might be at high risk of one of 
these events even without an error on the part of the hospital or physician. For example, cancer 
patients and other patients with compromised immune systems are excluded from the indicator for 
medically acquired infections because they may be highly susceptible to infection even if they are 
given high quality care.
17
  
The average age at hospitalization is 57, and 61 percent of the sample is female. 
Comorbidities – health conditions present that are not related to the principle hospital diagnosis – 
are also described. The most common of these are hypertension (present in over 37 percent of the 
                                                          
17 Software for the AHRQ patient safety indicators was downloaded 
http://www.qualityindicators.ahrq.gov/ on 10/2012. More details on the construction of these patient 
safety indicators are available at the AHRQ website.  
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sample), chronic lung disease such as chronic bronchitis or asthma (16 percent), and diabetes (16 
percent). 
We link our data on medical outcomes with state-level data on the timing of tort reforms 
from the Database of State Tort Law Reforms. We create an indicator variable equal to 1 during 
state-years for which a cap on non-economic damages is in place. We also create indicator 
variables corresponding to the presence of reforms capping punitive damages and reforms that 
modify the rules governing collateral source, joint and several liability, periodic payments, or split 
recovery. Over our period of analysis, 5 states instituted tort reform and 3 had tort reforms struck 
down through judicial rulings.  
V. THE EFFECT OF TORT REFORM ON PATIENT SAFETY EVENTS 
Our empirical strategy looks at changes in medical outcomes within states when tort 
reform is adopted, and compares these changes with the general trend in these outcomes across 
the country. To that end, we employ a state and year fixed effects model. We also account for 
possible trends within states by including state-specific linear trend variables and control for the 
patient characteristics of age, age squared, gender, and race. Specifically, we estimate: 
Yit=βs+βt+βs*timet+β1*capt + β2*characteristicsi+ εit    (2) 
Here, the variable cap equals one if the state had a cap on non-economic damages in year 
t. Our within-state variation in the variable cap comes both from the states adopting new caps on 
non-economic damages (changing the cap variable from 0 to 1) and from court decisions striking 
down caps on non-economic damages (changing cap from 1 to 0). The dependent variable is 
equal to one if the hospital visit resulted in any adverse patient safety event. The parameter of 
interest is the coefficient on cap, denoted beta. This parameter measures how the rate of adverse 
events changes when states enact a cap on non-economic damages. We also estimate the effect of 
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caps on non-economic damages on the probability of each patient safety indicator separately. 
Standard errors are clustered by state to account for correlation of the errors within states and over 
time.  
We focus on reforms that institute caps on non-economic damages because they are the 
most common type of tort reform adopted for the states and years available in the NIS. However, 
some states also enacted laws limiting punitive damages or amending other rules governing tort 
law. In addition to estimating (1), we also estimate models that include indicator variables for 
these other types of reforms. 
Table 3.5 presents our main results for the effect of a cap on non-economic damages on 
patient safety events. Estimates from a model including state, but not hospital, fixed effects are 
presented in the first column; estimates from a model with hospital fixed effects are in the second 
column. The first row shows the effect of tort reform on the probability that a hospital visit results 
in any patient safety event; subsequent rows show the effect of tort reform on each type of 
adverse event.  
Our estimate indicates that adopting a cap on non-economic damages increases the 
probability that a hospital visit results in an adverse patient safety event by between 0.05 and 0.07 
percentage points. This effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better. There is 
approximately a 1.3 percent chance that any hospitalization results in a patient safety event, so 
this estimate indicates that caps on non-economic damages increase patient safety events by 
between 4 and 5 percent.  
The subsequent rows show the effect of a cap on non-economic damages on each of the 
patient safety indicators. We find that the increase in patient safety events following the adoption 
of a cap on non-economic damages is driven largely by two factors: an increase in medically-
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acquired infections and an increase in adverse events during post-operative care. We find that the 
reforms to non-economic damages increases the probability of a medically-acquired infection by 
between 0.03 and 0.04 percentage points and the probability of post-operative wound dehiscence 
by about 0.04 percentage points. In the model with state fixed effects, we also find statistically 
significant increases in other post-operative adverse events (hip fracture, deep vein thrombosis, 
and respiratory failure), but these effects are not statistically significant in the model with hospital 
fixed effects.  
States may adopt other tort reforms at the same time they adopt a cap on non-economic 
damages. In Table 3.6, we present models that include binary variables that indicate other types of 
tort reform.  The first column contains the estimates from a model that includes the other three 
most common types of tort reform over this period: changes to rules governing collateral source, 
joint and several liability, and caps to punitive damages. The second column includes indicators 
for these four reforms, and also reforms to rules regarding periodic payments, split recovery, and 
punitive evidence. In these models, we continue to find that caps on non-economic damages 
increases patient safety events by about 0.07 percentage points. We find no statistically significant 
effect on adverse patient safety events for reforms relating to collateral source, joint and several 
liability, periodic payments, split recovery, or punitive evidence. However, in the first column, we 
do find that caps on punitive damages are associated with a statistically significant decrease in 
patient safety events, although it is not statistically significant when we control for the presence of 
other reforms. This result is surprising because it indicates that limits on punitive damages cause 
the opposite effect of limits on non-economic damages. 
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VI. THE ACCOUNTING COSTS OF TORT REFORM 
In this section, we provide a back-of-the-envelope analysis of the costs of tort reform that 
arise from an increase in preventable adverse events, using our estimates of the effect of tort 
reform on patient safety events and figures from the literature.  
Our estimates suggest that tort reform increases the probability of a hospital-acquired 
infection by 0.0003 percentage points (Table 3.5, Column 2). The average cost of a hospital-
acquired infection reported in Anderson et.al. (2006) (weighted by the incidence of infection) is 
$13,360.63. Combining these figures suggests that tort reform increases the average cost of a 
hospital admission by about $4.00. We also find that tort reform significantly increases the 
probability of post-operative wound dehiscence by 0.0004 (Table 3.5, Column 2). AHRQ (AHRQ 
2012) reports that post-operative wound dehiscence increases hospital charges by $40,323 on 
average. This implies that tort reform increases hospital charges by approximately $16 per 
hospital discharge. As there are about 34 million hospital discharges per year excluding newborns 
(NCHS 2010), this suggests a nationwide tort reform law would increase hospital-acquired 
infections by about 10,000 per year and post-operative wound dehiscence by about 13,600 cases 
per year, resulting in an increase in total hospital charges of about $680 million per year.  
VII. THE EFFECT OF TORT REFORM ON SELECTION INTO HOSPITAL CARE 
The reduced-form relationship between caps on non-economic damages and adverse 
patient events may be driven by changes in the amount or quality of care provided by the hospital 
or the effort provided by the physician, or it may be the result of physicians selecting a more risky 
group of patients into surgery. Although it is impossible for us to observe effort, we are able to 
directly observe patient characteristics, such as age, and comorbidities, such as AIDS or obesity, 
that are highly predictive of the risk of adverse hospital events. 
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To examine the effect of tort reform on selection into hospital care, we use a two-step 
process. First, we estimate a linear probability model of the conditional risk of having a patient 
safety event using only data from state-years where there was no cap on non-economic damages 
in places.  Then, we use this model to generate the predicted risk of a patient safety event based 
on patient characteristics for each hospital discharge, and use this predicted risk to measure if tort 
reform results in riskier patients entering the hospital.  
To generate our predicted values, we estimate a model that includes demographic 
characteristics (race, gender, age, and age squared) and 26 comorbidities. These comorbidities are 
listed in Table 3.7 and include, for example, congestive heart failure, HIV and AIDS, lymphoma, 
obesity, and drug and alcohol abuse.
18
  From this model, we generate propensity scores p-hat for 
each hospital discharge. To test the extent to which tort reform affects selection into 
hospitalizations, we estimate: 
P-hati=βs+βt+βt*timet+capt + εi     (3) 
Results are presented in Table 3.8. We find no statistically significant effect of the 
adoption of caps on non-economic damages on the risk score of patients and the point estimate is 
close to zero. This result suggests that caps on non-economic damage have little or no effect on 
the observed riskiness of patients who receive care.  
This model can only estimate the risk of patients based on characteristics we observe, and 
it is possible that tort reform induces selection of risky patients along dimensions that are not 
available to us in the NIS. However, considering we use many measures of comorbidities in 
addition to all available patient demographic information, we believe we capture the most salient 
measures of risk in our model. Furthermore, because we find a precise zero selection effect 
                                                          
18
 We do not report the estimates from this first stage model here. They are available upon request. 
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among observable characteristics, for there to be meaningful selection into hospital care among 
unobservable risk measures it would have to be true that these unobservable risk measures are 
virtually uncorrelated with patient demographic characteristics and comorbidities. We believe this 
is unlikely.  
Finally, we estimate a model that includes our propensity score as a covariate in our 
estimate of the effect of tort reform on patient safety. The estimates of this model are reported in 
Table 3.9. We find that the propensity score is a good predictor of patient safety events but, even 
conditioning on it, we continue to find that caps on non-economic damages are associated with a 
higher incidence of patient safety events. This result is not surprising given that we find no effect 
of tort reform on the average riskiness of patients admitted to the hospital.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Moral hazard and defensive medicine are two aspects of the same agency problem. Tort 
reform laws that reduce provider liability may lower medical costs by reducing the practice of 
inefficient defensive medicine, but they do so at the price of increasing providers’ moral hazard 
and inducing them to provide lower quality care.  
In this paper, we measure the effect of tort reform on a measure of the quality of hospital 
care: the incidence of preventable adverse hospital events. Using patient-level hospital discharge 
data, we find that caps on non-economic damages significantly increase the probability that a 
patient will experience an adverse hospital event. In particular, we find that hospital-acquired 
infections and adverse events during post-operative care increase when a cap on non-economic 
damages is instated. Our estimates suggest that a nationwide tort reform would increase patient 
safety events by about 25,000 cases per year and would increase total hospital charges by about 
$680 million per year.   
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X. TABLES 
 
 
Table 3.1 Reform Descriptions 
Cap on Non-Economic Damages Awards for noneconomic damages (pain and suffering) are 
capped at a specific amount. 
Joint and Several Liability Reform  A defendant must be at least 50% liable for the tort before 
they can be liable for 100% of the damages. 
Collateral Source Reform Reform allows payments to the plaintiff to be offset by 
whatever insurance money the plaintiff may have received. 
Caps on Punitive Damages Awards for punitive damages, which are given to punish 
the defendant, are capped. 
Split recovery Requires that some fraction of awards given for punitive 
damages be given to the state treasury. 
Punitive Damages Evidence Requires a plaintiff to prove punitive damages with 
"smoking gun" evidence. 
Periodic Payments Part or all of the awards to the plaintiff must be paid out 
over time as an annuity. 
* Kessler and McClellen (1996) and Avraham (2010) 
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Table 3.2: Changes in State Reform Laws 
 
REFORM 
ON 
REFORM 
OFF 
REFORM ON AND 
OFF 
Caps Non-Economic Damages 
FL (2003) OR (2000) IL (on 1995, off 1998, 
on 2006, off 2008) GA (2005)   
OH (2003)     
NV (2003)     
SC (2006)     
TX (2004)     
WI (1995)     
Caps Punitive Damages 
MO (2006)     
NJ (1996)     
OH (2005)     
Split Recovery Reform 
PA (2002) FL (1998) CA (on 2005, off 2007) 
  NY (1994)   
Collateral Source Reform 
PA (2002)     
WV (2003)     
WI (1995)     
Punitive Evidence Reform 
FL (2000)     
NJ (1996)     
WI (1995)     
Periodic Payments Reform 
NY (2004) AZ (1995) NV ( off 2003, on 2005) 
PA (2002)     
Joint and Several Liability 
Reform 
NV (2003)   IL (on 1994, off 1998) 
SC (2006)   PA (on 2002, off 2006) 
WI (1994)     
OH(2003)     
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Table 3.3: State Participation in the NIS by Year 
State Years Available in NIS 
AZ 1993-2001, 2003-2008 
CA 1993-2008 
CO 1993-2008 
CT 1993-2008 
FL 1993-2008 
IL 1993-2008 
IA 1993-2008 
KS 1993-2008 
MD 1993-2008 
MA 1993-2008 
NJ 1993-2008 
NY 1993-2008 
OR 1993-2008 
PA 1993-2003, 2008 
SC 1993-2008 
WA 1993-2008 
WI 1993-2008 
MO 1995-2008 
TN 1995-2008 
GA 1997-2008 
HI 1997-2008 
UT 1997-2008 
ME 1999-2002, 2007-2008 
VA 1999-2004, 2006-2008 
KY 2000-2008 
NC 2000-2008 
TX 2000-2008 
WV 2000-2008 
MI 2001-2008 
MN 2001-2008 
NE 2001-2008 
RI 2001-2008 
VT 2001-2008 
NV 2002-2008 
OH 2002-2008 
SD 2002-2008 
IN 2003-2008 
WY 2007-2008 
LA 2008 
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Table 3.4: AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators 
Indicator Description 
Death in Low-
Mortality Diagnostic 
Related Group (DRG) 
In-hospital death for patients admitted for a diagnostic related group with less than 0.5% 
mortality. Includes patients 18 and older or obstetric patients. Excludes cases with trauma, 
cancer, cases with an immuno-compromise state, and transfers to an acute-care facility. 
Pressure Ulcer Stage III or IV pressure ulcers (secondary diagnosis) among patients 18 and older. 
Excludes stays less than 5 days; cases with a principal diagnosis of 
pressure ulcer; cases with a secondary diagnosis of Stage III or IV pressure ulcer that is 
present on admission; cases with diseases of the skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast; 
obstetric cases; cases with hemiplegia, paraplegia, quadriplegia, spina bifida, or anoxic 
brain damage; cases in which debridement or pedicle graft is the only operating room 
procedure; discharges with debridement or pedicle graft before or on the same day as the 
major operating room procedure; and transfers from another facility. 
Death Rate among 
Surgical Inpatients 
with 
Serious Treatable 
Complications 
In-hospital deaths among patients ages 18 through 89 years or obstetric patients, with 
serious treatable complications (pneumonia, pulmonary embolism/deep vein thrombosis, 
sepsis, shock/cardiac arrest or gastrointestinal hemorrhage/acute ulcer). Excludes cases 
transferred to an acute care facility. 
Iatrogenic 
Pneumothorax 
Iatrogenic pneumothorax cases among surgical and medical discharges for patients ages 
18 years and older. Excludes cases with chest trauma, pleural effusion, thoracic surgery, 
lung or pleural biopsy, diaphragmatic surgery repair, or cardiac 
procedures; cases with a principal diagnosis of iatrogenic pneumothorax; cases with a 
secondary diagnosis of iatrogenic pneumothorax present on admission; and obstetric cases 
Central Venous 
Catheter-Related 
Blood Stream Infection 
Rate 
Central venous catheter-related bloodstream infections (secondary diagnosis) among 
medical and surgical discharges for patients ages 18 years and older or obstetric cases. 
Excludes cases with a principal diagnosis of a central venous catheter-related bloodstream 
infection, cases with a secondary diagnosis of a central venous catheter-related 
bloodstream infection present on admission, cases with stays less than 2 days, cases with 
an immune-compromised state, and cases with cancer. 
Postoperative Hip 
Fracture Rate 
Technical 
Specifications 
Postoperative hip fracture (secondary diagnosis) per 1,000 surgical discharges for 
patients ages 18 years and older. Excludes cases that are susceptible to falling 
(seizure disorder, syncope, stroke, occlusion of arteries, coma, cardiac arrest, 
poisoning, trauma, delirium or other psychoses, anoxic brain injury, metastatic 
cancer, lymphoid malignancy, bone malignancy, disorders of the musculoskeletal 
system, and disorders of connective tissue), cases with self-inflicted injury, cases 
with a principal diagnosis of hip fracture, cases with a secondary diagnosis 
Of hip fracture present on admission, and obstetric cases. 
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Table 3.4 (cont.): AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators 
Perioperative 
Hemorrhage or 
Hematoma Rate 
Perioperative hemorrhage or hematoma cases with control of perioperative 
hemorrhage, drainage of hematoma, or a miscellaneous hemorrhage- or 
hematoma-related procedure following surgery per 1,000 surgical discharges for 
patients ages 18 years and older. Excludes cases with a diagnosis of coagulation 
disorder; cases with a principal diagnosis of perioperative hemorrhage or 
hematoma; cases with a secondary diagnosis of perioperative hemorrhage or 
hematoma present on admission; cases where the only operating room procedure is 
control of perioperative hemorrhage, drainage of hematoma, or a miscellaneous 
hemorrhage- or hematoma-related procedure; and obstetric cases. 
Postoperative 
Physiologic and 
Metabolic 
Derangement Rate 
Postoperative physiologic and metabolic derangements (secondary diagnosis) or acute 
renal failures (secondary diagnosis) with dialysis among surgical discharges for patients 
ages 18 years and older. Excludes cases with principal diagnosis for physiologic and 
metabolic derangement or acute renal failure; cases with secondary diagnosis for 
physiologic and metabolic derangement or acute renal failure present on admission; cases 
with secondary diagnosis of acute renal failure and dialysis before or on the same day as 
the first operating room procedure;  cases with derangement and diabetes; cases with 
acute renal failure and acute myocardial infarction, cardiac arrhythmia, cardiac arrest, 
shock, hemorrhage, gastrointestinal hemorrhage or chronic renal failure; and obstetric 
cases. 
Postoperative 
Respiratory Failure 
Rate 
Postoperative respiratory failure (secondary diagnosis), mechanical ventilation, or 
reintubation cases among surgical discharges for patients ages 18 years and older. 
Excludes cases with principal diagnosis for acute respiratory failure; cases with secondary 
diagnosis for acute respiratory failure present on admission; cases in which tracheostomy 
is the only operating room procedure or in which tracheostomy occurs before the first 
operating room procedure; cases with neuromuscular disorders, laryngeal or pharyngeal 
surgery, craniofacial anomalies that had a procedure for the face, esophageal resection, 
lung cancer, or degenerative neurological disorders; cases with a procedure on the nose, 
mouth, or pharynx; cases with respiratory or circulatory diseases; and obstetric discharges 
Perioperative 
Pulmonary Embolism 
or Deep Vein 
Thrombosis Rate 
Perioperative pulmonary embolism or deep vein thrombosis (secondary diagnosis) among 
surgical 
discharges for patients ages 18 years and older. Excludes cases with principal diagnosis 
for pulmonary embolism or deep vein thrombosis; cases with secondary diagnosis for 
pulmonary embolism or deep vein thrombosis present on admission; cases in which 
interruption of vena cava is the only operating room procedure or in which interruption of 
vena cava occurs before or on the same day as the first operating room procedure; and 
obstetric discharges. 
Postoperative Sepsis 
Rate 
Postoperative sepsis cases (secondary diagnosis) per 1,000 elective surgical discharges for 
patients ages 18 years and older. Excludes cases with a principal diagnosis of sepsis, cases 
with a secondary diagnosis of sepsis present on admission, cases with a principal  
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Table 3.4 (cont.): AHRQ Patient Safety Indicators 
 diagnosis of infection, cases with a secondary diagnosis of infection present on admission 
(only if they also have a secondary diagnosis of sepsis), cases with an 
immunocompromised state, cases with cancer,obstetric discharges, and cases with stays 
less than four days. 
Postoperative Wound 
Dehiscence Rate 
Postoperative reclosures of the abdominal wall per 1,000 abdominopelvic surgery 
discharges 
for patients ages 18 years and older. Excludes cases in which the abdominal wall 
reclosure occurs on or before the day of the first abdominopelvic surgery, cases with an 
immunocompromised state, cases with stays less than two days, and obstetric cases. 
Accidental Puncture or 
Laceration Rate 
Accidental punctures or lacerations (secondary diagnosis) during procedure for discharges 
for patients ages 18 years and older. Excludes cases with accidental puncture or laceration 
as a principal diagnosis, cases with accidental puncture or laceration as a secondary 
diagnosis that is present on admission, spinal surgery cases, and obstetric cases. 
Obstetric Trauma Rate 
–Vaginal Delivery 
With Instrument 
Third and fourth degree obstetric traumas per 1,000 instrument-assisted vaginal deliveries 
Obstetric Trauma Rate 
–Vaginal Delivery 
Without Instrument 
Third and fourth degree obstetric traumas per 1,000 vaginal deliveries. Excludes cases 
with instrument-assisted delivery. 
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Table 3.5: The Effect of a Cap on Non-Economic Damages on Patient Safety Events 
 
Cap on Non-Economic Damages 
  (1) (2) 
Any patient safety indicator 0.00073*** 0.00053**  
 
(0.00019) (0.00022) 
Death in Low-Mortality DRGs 0.0000034 0.0000255 
 
(0.00003) (0.00002) 
Decubitus Ulcer -0.0001925 -0.0003207 
 
(0.00074) (0.00074) 
Iatrogenic Pneumothorax -0.0000911 -0.0000691 
 
(0.00006) (0.00005) 
Infections due to Medical Care 0.00039*** 0.00030*** 
 
(0.00013) (0.00011) 
Post-op Hip Fracture 0.00003* 0.0000107 
 
(0.00001) (0.00002) 
Post-op Hemorrhage or Hematoma 0.0000586 0.0000155 
 
(0.00010) (0.00007) 
Post-op Physiologic and Metabolic 
Derangement 
0.0000964 0.0000191 
(0.00010) (0.00011) 
Post-op Pulmonary Embolism or Deep 
Vein Thrombosis 
0.00095** 0.00052 
(0.00036) (0.00034) 
Post-op Sepsis 0.0006063 -0.000213 
 
(0.00064) (0.00040) 
Post-op Wound Dehiscence 0.000236**  0.00044** 
 
(0.00009) (0.00020) 
Failure to Rescue 0.00369 0.00204 
 
(0.00405) (0.00348) 
Post-op Respiratory Failure 0.00090**  0.0003015 
 
(0.00044) (0.00023) 
Accidental Puncture or Laceration 0.0002322 0.0002132 
 
(0.00023) (0.00020) 
Obstetric Trauma- Vaginal Delivery with 
Instrument 
-0.019949 -0.006875 
(0.01551) (0.00756) 
Obstetric Trauma- Vaginal Delivery 
without Instrument 
-0.00249**  -0.0003306 
(0.00109) (0.00088) 
State Fixed Effects Yes No 
Hospital Fixed Effects No Yes 
Notes: Significance levels *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***:p<0.01. All models include state-specific linear 
time trends. Data source Nationwide Inpatient Sample and DSTLR 3; see text for details. 
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Table 3.6: The Effect of Other Tort Reforms on Patient Safety Events 
  
Any patient 
safety indicator 
Any patient safety 
indicator 
  (1) (2) 
Cap on Non-Economic 
Damages 
0.00080***  0.00078** 
(0.00024) (0.00035) 
Joint and Several Liability -0.00036 -0.00026 
 
(0.00084) (0.00084) 
Collateral Source Reform 0.00024 0.00021 
 
(0.00063) (0.00083) 
Caps on Punitive Damages -0.00161***  -0.00159 
 
(0.00048) (0.00049) 
Split recovery 
 
-0.00036 
  
(0.00033) 
Punitive Damages Evidence  
 
0.00019 
  
(0.00025) 
Periodic Payments 
 
0.00002 
  
(0.00045) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
Notes: Significance levels *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***:p<0.01. All 
models include state-specific linear time trends. Data source Nationwide 
Inpatient Sample and DSTLR 3; see text for details. 
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Table 3.7: List of Patient Comorbidities 
Congestive Heart Failure 
Pulmonary Circulation disorders 
Peripheral vascular disease 
Hypertension 
Paralysis 
Other neurological disorders 
Chronic pulmonary disease 
Diabetes without chronic complications 
Diabetes with chronic complications 
Hypothyroidism 
Renal failure 
Liver disease 
Chronic peptic ulcer disease 
HIV and AIDS 
Lymphoma 
Metastatic cancer 
Solid tumor without metastasis 
Rheumatoid arthritis/collagen vascular diseases 
Coagulation deficiency 
Obesity 
Weight loss 
Fluid and electrolyte disorders 
Blood loss anemia 
Deficiency anemias 
Alcohol abuse 
Drug abuse 
Psychoses 
Depression 
Detailed description of algorithm to assign 
comorbidities can be found at 
http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/. 
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Table 3.8: The Effects of Tort Reform on the Riskiness of Patients Admitted to the Hospital 
  
Probability of Adverse 
Event,  
Probability of 
Adverse Event,  
Estimated with 
demographic 
characteristics only 
Estimated with 
demographic 
characteristics 
and 
comorbidities 
Cap on Non-Economic 
Damages=1 
0.00000 0.00000 
 
(0.00012) (0.00020) 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Notes: Significance levels *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***:p<0.01. All 
models include state-specific linear time trends. Data source 
Nationwide Inpatient Sample and DSTLR 3; see text for details. 
 
Table 3.9: The Effects of Tort Reform on Patient Safety Events, 
Controlling for Predicted Risk of Adverse Event 
 
  Adverse Patient 
Safety Event=1 
Adverse Patient 
Safety Event=1 
Caps on Non-Economic Damages=1 0.00070*** 0.00066** 
(0.00021) (0.00025) 
Probability of Adverse Event, Estimated with 
demographic characteristics only 
0.92380*** 
 
 (0.07068) 
 
Probability of Adverse Event, Estimated with 
demographic characteristics and comorbidities  
0.87197*** 
 
 
(0.04527) 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
 
